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Abstract 
 
 In this thesis I have studied the processes of de-Nazification and reeducation 
carried out by the Soviet Military Administration in Eastern Germany from 1945 to 1949 
to create a socialist country. It begins with a background on the political developments 
across Germany after World War II. Attention is paid to the creation of the Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany and the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. The thesis moves into a discussion of the de-Nazification process as the purging 
of National Socialists from society. While punitive measures were utilized at first, I 
highlight the transition that takes place to more rehabilitative measures in 1947. In terms 
of reeducation I discuss mass organizations, the educational system and the cultural 
sphere. Each topic receives its own chapter and the development of socialism in each 
sphere of society is analyzed in depth.  
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Introduction	  
 
 Germany after World War II was in a completely devastated state that the Soviet 
Union, the United States, and Great Britain had to reconstruct. The problem was in how 
this reconstruction should take shape. The Nazis had championed a racist and aggressive 
nationalism that swept through the German people. It was now the responsibility of the 
Allied powers to undo this ideological damage. Immediately after the surrender of 
Germany the Allied powers divided Germany into three zones, with France being 
delegated a small zone of occupation, making a total of four. Though Germany was 
divided into these four sections, the Allies agreed that they would work together to create 
a unified, sovereign Germany. The creation of an Allied Control Council and agreements 
made at a joint Allied Conference, the Potsdam Conference, in July 1945 seemed to 
indicate that a peace between the Allied powers could be found. There was promise for a 
genuine, democratic, unified Germany. 
The problem arose when it became clear that each Allied Power had a different 
vision of how this unified Germany should look. While the United States and the Western 
allies wanted a genuine democracy, the Soviet Union became increasingly interested in 
imposing its brand of socialism. As the 1940s progressed, the Soviet Union’s relationship 
with the West faltered as its relationship with the Communist Party of Germany in the 
East flourished. While the Western Allies relationship with the East wavered, relations 
between the Western Allies strengthened. It grew into the formation of Bizonia, or the 
combination of the British and American Zones of Occupation, in 1947. This movement 
solidified the allegiance of the Western Allies to one another and events in the Western 
zone, such as the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, 
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increasingly made the Soviet Union feel isolated in a country it occupied equally. These 
feelings of isolation did not subside and the international stage became more heated. This 
thesis will explore these developments and specifically study the developments toward 
Soviet-style socialism in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany. 
 My argument in this thesis is that from the beginning of the occupation the policy 
of the Soviet Union was directed toward ensuring that a restored Germany would be 
friendly toward the Soviet Union and as time went on that seemed to require Communist 
leadership. The devastated state of the defeated country meant that Germany had to 
completely rebuild and the policy of the Soviet Union sought to transform Germany – or 
at least the part of it that they controlled – as well as rebuild. The Soviet Union took an 
aggressive approach toward de-Nazification initially, at the same time that it cooperated 
with the Western Allies to work toward the eventual reemergence of a sovereign and 
united Germany. The Communist Party of Germany, itself rebuilt around a core of 
German Communists who had fled to Moscow when the Nazis took over Germany, went 
so far as to envision a unified and independent Germany. At times it was even more 
energetic than the Soviet Union, but in fact its activity was controlled by the Soviet 
Union, which tended to restrain its ambitions so as not to rock the boat. Throughout the 
late 1940s, the increase in tensions between the East and the West on the international 
stage also affected how the occupying powers went about de-Nazification and the 
reconstruction of Germany. While the West spoke of restoring “democracy,” the Soviet 
Union called for “anti-fascist democracy” and hinted that this would lead toward the 
making of socialism. Ultimately, the Soviet Union grew less and less interested in 
cooperating with the West and gave greater power to the German Communists, which 
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together led to the creation of the Communist-controlled German Democratic Republic in 
1949. The establishment of the institutions of Soviet style socialism can be seen in 
various aspects of society from 1945-1949. The three areas I focus on in this thesis are 
mass organizations, the educational system, and the German cultural sphere. 
 Establishing and controlling mass organizations, the educational system, and the 
cultural sphere were all part of the Soviet/Communist path to socialism. Mass 
organizations saw a two-stage process of development throughout the 1940s. They began 
operating in the Soviet Zone sooner than in the West, which the West saw as a premature 
attempt to establish a political landscape. In 1947 these mass organizations began to 
transform into agencies for making good socialists. The educational system and the 
cultural sphere did not have this same two-stage development. The Soviet Military 
Administration had total control after 1945 and the influence of the Communist Party of 
Germany was present from the beginning, though that influence was subtle. As the 
occupation period passed and tensions between East and West grew, the Soviet Union’s 
efforts to go beyond de-Nazification to the reeducation of East Germans became more 
overt. It became clear that the Allied powers had different visions for the future of 
Germany. The increasingly hostile relationship with the West mounted to a break in 
1949, resulting in the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and 
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).  
The materials used for my thesis are wide-ranging because of the broad spectrum 
of topics I cover. Primary sources that proved most helpful to me were the collected 
works of various prominent Communists and their allies, such as Walter Ulbricht, Otto 
Grotewohl, and Anton Ackermann. Published in German and translated into English, 
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these works helped provide a better understanding of the language used during the 1940s. 
The work of Walter Ulbricht was the most accessible, which is why he is quoted often 
throughout this thesis. Essays and speeches by Otto Grotewohl were also available and 
these provided valuable insight into the Social Democratic Party and its burgeoning 
relationship with the Communist Party of Germany in 1945-1946. Newspapers from the 
time, namely the Tägliche Rundschau, Neues Deutschland, and Deutsche Volkszeitung, 
were all found in nearby libraries and helped fill in any gaps left by the essays, speeches, 
and my secondary sources. Any speeches that were not found in the collected works of 
Communists or Social Democrats could often be found in the newspaper of the days after 
a speech or order was given. This provided me with an even wider array of sources to 
look for when trying to understand the complex developments of the Soviet Occupation 
Zone.  
I tried to read as many secondary sources as possible to get a handle on the 
complexities of the Soviet Occupation Zone. It is interesting to see how different 
generations of historians perceive the events of postwar Germany. I tried to consult 
sources that were written during the period of the two Germanies as well as more recent 
texts in order to absorb the range of perspectives. Recent accounts include Giles 
MacDonogh’s After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation. Written in 2007, 
it is part of a wave of books studying postwar Germany that does not see the Soviet 
Union as the sole enemy. As the title of the book suggests, all Allies were at fault for the 
brutality that occurred after the war. MacDonogh does not exempt any of the Allied 
powers from the charge of brutal behavior against the German people. He does not seem 
to hold the usual Cold War biases and this helped me as I tried to understand the 
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occupation period myself. It gave an account of Germany as it might actually have been, 
not an idealized Germany under the great American occupation or the evil Soviet 
Occupation. Another important source for studying the Allied Powers as a whole was 
Frederick Taylor’s Exorcising Hitler, written in 2011. While Taylor focused solely on the 
process of de-Nazification, like MacDonogh he provides an account of all four occupying 
powers and remains equally critical of each Allied approach to de-Nazification 
throughout. He argues that the Soviet Union was the most aggressive of the occupying 
forces in the de-Nazification process, but he also believes that the Soviet Union gave the 
most opportunity for reintegration of former Nazis back into society. This was a new 
perspective on the Soviet Union as most other accounts tended to demonize the Soviet 
Union. This idea that the Soviet Union was not all bad seems to be a newer approach to 
the study of the early Cold War years and one that I took into consideration as I worked 
to formulate my own opinions.  
Timothy Vogt’s Denazification in Soviet Occupied Germany is an intensive study 
of the East done in 2001. As this study related to part of my own thesis this dissertation 
was central to my understanding of the process of de-Nazification in the Soviet Zone. It 
was well researched and provided a more in depth study of the policies that were 
implemented to carry out de-Nazification. Vogt introduced the argument that there could 
have been a transition in the process of de-Nazification that aided in the rehabilitation of 
Nazis. De-Nazification had purely meant purging people from society before, but through 
Vogt’s argument the real complexities postwar became clearer. Again, like MacDonogh’s 
study, this book was written a while after the Cold War and therefore was distant from 
the typical animosities against the Soviet Union. While there was acknowledgment of the 
	   6 
high number of purges that took place, the focus on rehabilitation is not found in early 
studies of policy in the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany. This encouraged me to look 
for more transformations and periods of rehabilitation like this in mass organizations, the 
educational system and the cultural sphere, although such developments were not always 
apparent. 
The educational system is a complex issue to study and one that I feel deserves 
much more attention than I gave it in this thesis. Benita Blessing’s The Antifascist 
Classroom: Denazfication in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (2006) gave an 
account of the Soviet Zone educational system that placed more power in the hands of the 
Germans in the reconstruction of their schools. This falls in line with the other recent 
literature that does not as readily condemn the Soviet Union for the developments in the 
East. She argues that educational values were founded in the history of German education 
and merely changed to fit the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) agenda. This was a 
new perspective for me about the whole of the Soviet Zone because it did not give much 
consideration to the influence of the Soviet Military Administration. While the Soviet 
Military Administration was the controlling power, to Blessing the reformation of the 
educational system was something that was German-initiated. Reading this account 
forced me to reconsider how I looked at the development of the educational system 
because it was not as clear as in other areas of society. There was a lot of curriculum 
change throughout the late 1940s and as the de-Nazification process changed so did the 
nature of the teaching profession. Education was constantly changing to fit the demands 
of the Soviet Zone and I drew this same conclusion as I continued to study the cultural 
sphere in the late 1940s. 
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Historian David Pike has done much work studying the cultural sphere in East 
Germany. His book The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany 1945-1949 
(1993) and his work on censorship in East Germany argued that the Soviet Military 
Administration and the Communist Party of Germany were aggressive in their control of 
culture from the beginning of the occupation period. He was not shy in displaying his 
biases. He wrote much of his work in the few years following the reunification of East 
and West, so he may still be subject to the attitudes of the Soviet Union as the ultimate 
enemy. It fits in with the trend that develops as historians studying the Cold War become 
farther removed from the period itself. Pike was still very much a part of Cold War 
history only a few years after its end, and so he can hold on to such notions. Other facets 
of his study that I found helpful were that Pike provided examples of activity in the West 
to compare to developments in the East and it was this comparison that helped me see the 
different sides to the cultural sphere in Germany. It was also through these books that I 
started to see that there was not a two-stage process of transformation in the cultural 
sphere as could be seen in the de-Nazification process and the revival of mass 
organizations. Censorship and other methods of control were exercised from the 
beginning of occupation, and this is central to understanding the origins of the German 
Democratic Republic. 
Memoirs were invaluable when trying to get a better sense for the realities of Nazi 
Germany and postwar East Germany. They also followed a more traditional feeling of 
animosity toward the Soviet Union and the German Communist Party. Wolfgang 
Leonhard’s Child of the Revolution provided insight into the KPD leadership that I might 
not have otherwise have had access to. As a defector from the Communist Party of 
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Germany I understand his biases against the Communist Party of Germany and its 
relationship with the Soviet Union, but his accounts of the early postwar years still need 
to be considered when searching to understand the development of East Germany. Other 
memoirs used in passing are Joel Agee’s 12 Years and Joachim Fest’s Not I. While Agee 
focuses on life in East Germany, Fest recounts his experience in Nazi Germany. Fest’s 
account of Nazi Germany is interesting because his family did not actively support the 
Nazi Party. He provides insight into the life of a boy who was forced into the the 
activities of the Nazi Party, such as the Hitler Youth, without the enthusiasm of a 
committed Nazi. Agee mirrors Fest’s lack of enthusiasm for politics in his relationship 
with Communism. He joins the Free German Youth group mostly because he has to, 
partly because he wants to be with his friends. Agee does not have positive memories of 
the KPD and the Soviet Military Administration and this is indicative of literature being 
produced during the Cold War. Both Fest and Agee enlighten the reader about 
developments in Germany during various points of its history through their memoirs. 
They provide points of reference, what Germany was like during the Nazi years in Fest’s 
book and to how it became  a socialist state in Agee’s. Studying the similarities and 
differences of the two Germanies was interesting as I tried to better understand the 
transformation of Germany. Each memoir gave me a different opinion on the occupying 
powers and influences in Germany and helped me see how people felt about these forces 
immediately after the war. They were a solid baseline as I studied more recent sources 
that changed this traditional postwar opinion.  
This thesis is broken down into five chapters, beginning with a chapter on the 
political developments in all of Germany after World War II. The political relationships 
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between the West and the East as well as between the Soviet Union and the KPD are the 
foundation for the overarching argument about de-Nazification and the making of 
Socialist East Germany. They also help explain the political landscape within East 
Germany. Specifically, it provides further explanation about the development of a unified 
working class party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which would come to rule East 
Germany for its forty-year history. It is the political relationships set up in Chapter 1 that 
dictate the process of de-Nazification examined in Chapter 2. The Allied powers all 
agreed upon the necessity of de-Nazification, but as we see throughout the rest of 
German society, there were disagreements on the best path for Germany. Chapter 2 looks 
at the physical removal of Nazis from positions of power in German society through de-
Nazification. It studies how this process began and how it transformed into the 
rehabilitative process that helped create socialist citizens. 
Chapters 3-5 each focus on a different dimension in the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation. Mass organizations are studied in Chapter 3. Major social and political 
organizations are discussed to better understand their contributions to the indoctrination 
of the East German people. Trade Unions and youth organizations are the main focus, but 
it is all connected back to their relationship to the political sector. Chapters 4 and 5 focus 
on education and culture respectively. Since these are the two areas of society that did not 
undergo the two stages of development like the others they have been grouped together at 
the end. They act as an exception to the idea that implementation of socialist ideas began 
in 1947 and instead demonstrate that socialist influence was being implanted in different 
institutions all along. In studying the various levels of education and how the schools 
dealt with the German past and progressing into the future, it became more apparent that 
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socialism was a vision for the future of Germany from the beginning. The cultural sphere 
produced similar thoughts when looking at the urgency with which the Soviet Military 
Administration and the Communist Party of Germany tried to bring cultural figures back 
to the East. Their infusion of art and film from the Soviet Union into Germany early on in 
the period of occupation suggest that the Soviet Military Administration wanted to exert 
its influence over the future of Germany immediately.  
 Ultimately, the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany underwent a series of 
developments from 1945-1949 that make up the body of my thesis. While the 
developments of different spheres of society were all occurring at once, they were not all 
happening in the same way. This is what made studying the Soviet Zone of Occupation in 
Germany so difficult. There did not seem to be one pattern I could follow that inevitably 
led to the creation of the German Democratic Republic. I enjoyed taking on the challenge 
of working through the early, complicated years of post war Germany and particularly the 
problems facing the KPD and the Soviet Military Administration. There were many 
factors contributing to the decisions of the leaders in the Soviet Zone and when also 
considering the developments in the West at the same time I can begin to appreciate the 
how difficult it must have been to understand these developments as they were taking 
place. There were so many unknowns in the years after World War II, and trying to 
understand them all 70 years later is still a challenge. I look forward to continuing this 
study in the future and hopefully gaining an even better grasp on the postwar years of 
Germany. 
	   11 
Chapter 1: 
 
The Soviet Occupation Zone: Birthplace of the German Democratic Republic 
 
 The German Army surrendered on May 8, 1945. The Russian Army reached 
Berlin toward the end of April and had to fight district by district and street by street to 
dislodge determined defenders, some of whom went underground. Therefore, the Red 
Army had to pick the city apart to establish control. Their behavior was brutal, extremely 
aggressive and acquisitive. Russian soldiers looted with impunity: some were seen with 
multiple watches on their arms and others collected novelties, such as cigarette lighters, 
which were then a new commodity. The commodity many demanded for themselves was 
German women, and unfortunately rape became the norm. A rough estimate of the 
number of women raped in Berlin right after the war is 20,000. Sometimes men told their 
wives to give themselves to Russians quickly, while others were killed trying to defend 
them.1 The harrowing account by one woman of her life in Berlin in May 1945 tells how 
she survived by submitting to one Russian soldier with whom she stayed and who then 
became her protector, warding off the rest of his friends and fellow soldiers.2 Difficult as 
this situation was, it was better than living in fear of the rest of the men of the Red Army. 
It was a tactic for survival, and that was the struggle for most Germans after the 
devastation of World War II. When the German Army surrendered to the Russian army 
on May 9, the Red Army controlled all of Berlin. After negotiation with the other Allies, 
British and American soldiers arrived in Berlin beginning in June 1945 and a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Giles Macdonogh, After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation (New York: Basic Books, 
2007), 96-100.  
2Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in a Conquered City, trans. Phillip Boehm (New York: 
Picador, 2005), 64. 	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lasting peace came to Berlin.3 The Russians now occupied the Eastern Sector of Berlin 
and the Eastern party of Germany and had to work together with the Allied powers in the 
Western Zone toward the reconstruction of Germany.  
 Months before the Red Army established military control in Berlin and Eastern 
Germany, a small visionary group of German Communist exiles who had sought refuge 
from Hitler by fleeing to the Soviet Union began to develop a broad program to 
restructure German society. Their Aktionsprogramm (Action Program), adopted in 
October of 1944, laid out the central differences with the Hitler Regime, what the 
German Communist Party (KPD) saw as key issues and finally how they proposed to 
change society. The Nazis were accused of imperialism and being a terrorist regime 
contributing to the economic, political and overall national catastrophe that was 
Germany.4 The KPD set forth four main action goals: 
1)   Develop broad antifascist and antimilitary mass propaganda  
2)   Develop a mass movement for the struggle for democracy that includes all 
organizations, parties, groups, to create popular democracy to annihilate the 
fascist-imperialist regime tendency in society and begin the fight for a democratic 
People’s regime. 
3)   Create a bloc of organizations to struggle for democracy 
4)   Create a unified working class, that is closely unified and ready to support the 
correct policies and thus can be the leading force in the democratic struggle.5 
 
This four–point action program provided the Communist Party with a foundation for 
action as soon as the war ended. No immediate plans were outlined because the German 
Communists recognized that the basic conditions were to be controlled by the Red Army. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Macdonogh, After the Reich, 103.	  
4	  Communist Party of Germany, “Aktionsprogramm des ZK der KPD für einen Block der kämpferischen 
Demokratie zur antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umgestaltung Deutschlands, 21. Oktober 1944,” in 
Dokumente zur Geschichte der SED (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981), 392.  
5	  Communist Party of Germany, “Aktionsprogramm des ZK der KPD für einen Block der kämpferischen 
Demokratie zur antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umgestaltung Deutschlands, 21. Oktober 1944,” 393-394.	  
	   13 
But the action program did give them a vision for the future and allowed them to begin 
preparation for the large task of reconstructing Germany. They wanted to reconstruct 
Germany in their own image, but knew their power would be limited because they 
foresaw the influence the Soviet Union would have on reconstruction. 
Some of these exiled German Communists grouped around Walter Ulbricht, and 
often called the Ulbricht Group, returned to Berlin on April 27, 1945.6 Walter Ulbricht 
(1893-1973) was a leader in the the German Communist Party (KPD) and fled Germany 
in 1933 to escape Hitler and the Nazi Party. Initially in exile in Paris and then Prague, 
Ulbricht moved to Moscow in 1938 where he became the KPD’s permanent 
representative to the Communist International Organization (Comintern).7 He helped the 
Red Army process information about the German army and helped indoctrinate prisoners 
of war to communism.8 He organized a group of committed German Communists in 
Moscow to help him in reconstructing Germany after the war. Prominent members of the 
Ulbricht group included Fritz Erpenbeck, Hans Mahle, and Wolfgang Leonhard. Fritz 
Erpenbeck (1897-1975) and Hans Mahle (1911-1999) assisted in the cultural 
reconstruction of Germany through their contributions to theater and Radio Berlin. It was 
this group of men that assisted the Soviet Military Administration in the early months 
after the war to stabilize Germany. 
Wolfgang Leonhard (1921-2014) defected to the West in 1949 and later provided 
a detailed account of his experience in the Communist Party of Germany. He described 
the lack of communication among the Ulbricht Group as they set out for Germany 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Macdonogh, After the Reich, 104.	  
7Carola Stern, Ulbricht: A Political Biography (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 77.  
8Stern, Ulbricht, 86. 	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because no one but Walter Ulbricht knew where in Germany they were headed or what 
type of work they were to do. He only knew that he and his fellow German Communists 
“had a political mission to carry out, the target of which was Fascism…[and a] purpose 
which was the transformation of Germany into a democracy.”9 Like the Action Plan put 
forth by the German Communists in 1944, this was a vague program for the future of 
Germany. With Walter Ulbricht as leader of German Communist reconstruction, though, 
no questions were asked. Leonhard characterized Ulbricht as a hard-line man who 
followed the party line with no exceptions. To Leonhard, “[his] tone…permitted no 
contradiction. His manner left no room for doubt that the Party’s policy was to be settled 
by him.”10 This strict following of the Party line continued to characterize Ulbricht and 
his policies for the Soviet Zone. 
 The Ulbricht group joined the Red Army in Germany as it forged its way into 
Berlin, but they had no authority yet as they were still citizens of a defeated nation. The 
Soviet Union redefined its role in Germany, from conquering army to occupation force 
through the creation of the Soviet Military Administration on June 9, 1945. The Western 
Allies about the same time similarly created Military Administrations. Under Soviet 
Military Administration, order slowly emerged in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Order 
No. 1, which established the organization of the military administration in the Soviet 
Zone, stated that, “The Soviet Military Administration has been formed to control the 
fulfillment of the conditions imposed on Germany by her unconditional surrender and to 
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administer the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany.”11 Red Army Marshal Georgy 
Zhukov (1896-1974) was made Chief of the Soviet Military Administration.12 Zhukov 
had worked his way up in the Red Army, first being noticed in 1937 for his effective 
defense during the undeclared conflict with Japan on the Manchurian border and then 
advancing rapidly at the end of the 1930’s as Stalin’s regime needed fresh leadership 
after the secret military purge. His largest contribution to World War II was his work as 
commander of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts and his leadership of one of the key 
armies involved in the capture of Berlin.13 His command over the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany was his reward for the work he had done with the Red Army, 
but the functions of the new Soviet Military Administration were distinct from the 
function of the military. While the Red Army facilitated the official end of the war and 
carried out the occupation of Germany, the Soviet Military Administration’s job was to 
oversee the reestablishment of German society. The Soviet Military Administration also 
provided support for the KPD in Berlin. It helped bring back to Germany more than 70 
German Communists and 300 prisoners of war who were trained in Russian anti-fascist 
schools throughout June 1945.14 The myriad of jobs for the Soviet Military 
Administration provided a structure for the Soviets as they exerted control over Germany 
and provided a foundation for the development of Germany as a whole.  
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On June 10, 1945, just one day after the formal establishment of its own Military 
Administration, the Soviet Military Administration announced that the German people 
were able to form political parties.15 Order No. 2 allowed for “the formation and activity 
of all anti-fascist parties having as their aim the final extirpation of all remnants of 
fascism and the consolidation of the foundations of democracy and civil liberties in 
Germany.”16 The Nazi Party as well as most of the right wing parties of the Weimar 
period had been immediately dissolved after the Red Army’s arrival as well as most of 
the right wing parties of the Weimar period, such as the German People’s Party 
(Deutsche Volkspartei; DVP).  With the announcement on June 10, the Communist Party 
of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands; KPD) and the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschand, SPD), were reestablished as 
independent parties.17   
German Communists had been working with the Soviet Military from the 
beginning, but it was not until Order No. 2 was issued that the Communists were 
officially recognized as a political party. They were aligned with the Soviet Union 
because of their common belief in the Communist cause, and many of the German 
Communists had spent the Hitler years in exile in Moscow. Though they were allies with 
the Soviets, German Communists were still Germans by nationality and were held 
responsible for the atrocities of World War II like their fellow countrymen. The KPD had 
a ready made leadership of exiles, such as the Ulbricht Group, who had spent the war in 
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Moscow and returned to Berlin with a strong Marxist-Leninist base.18 There were 
suggestions that the KPD should become a mass people’s party as opposed to a cadre 
party, which implied that it should appeal not only to the working class but also to 
farmers, peasants, Christians, and intellectuals.19 These Communist returnees were 
committed to this idea of an anti-fascist, democratic political front and were deeply 
opposed to merging the Communist Party and the Social Democrats, whom they 
considered unschooled reformists.20  With its deep suspicion of newly-minted 
Communists and a historic distrust of the Social Democratic Party, the KPD was insistent 
on remaining an independent party in the beginning. 
The SPD in the Soviet Zone was in a different position than the KPD because it 
did not have a close relationship with the Soviet Union like the KPD. Fewer members of 
the SPD had worked underground in Germany than had Communists during World War 
II. Much of its leadership had fled west as opposed to the KPD, which fled to Moscow, 
and come the end of the war many did not return. The SPD had many of the same policy 
goals as the KPD, namely the empowerment and unification of the working class, but 
they did not have the support of the Soviet Union like the KPD, nor indeed of any great 
power.21 This made it difficult for them to organize immediately after the war. Many in 
the SPD were willing to unify with the KPD from the moment the political arena was 
restored in June 1945, particularly a prominent Social Democrat Otto Grotewohl. 
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Grotewohl (1894-1964) had joined the party in 1922 and in 1925 became a member of 
the Reichstag. In 1933 he was removed in Hitler’s takeover and was imprisoned several 
times throughout the reign of the Nazi Party. He later became the first Prime Minister of 
East Germany. Grotewohl argued in mid-June 1945 that the SPD ultimately wanted the 
same things for the working class as the Communists, that is,  “the abolition of class rule 
and …equal rights and responsibilities for all without discrimination by sex or descent.”22 
Grotewohl wanted to unite all parties in his fight for working class people.   
 The KPD asserted its independent role by announcing to the people their program 
for the reconstruction of Germany, which came in a speech on June 25, 1945 by Ulbricht. 
He stressed that democratization was “in the national interest and in the immediate 
interest of the working class, for such a democratic-parliamentary system gives the 
working class the opportunity to unite after long division and thus create the guarantee 
for the future unification of the people.” He went on to say that socialism could not yet be 
realized in Germany because of division in the working class and the ideological 
devastation caused to the working class by the Nazi Party.23 Thus Ulbricht placed more 
emphasis on forging a path for democracy and for the complete destruction of Nazism 
than on the need to establish a socialist system. Ulbricht reassured the people that 
Germany would not be forced to follow an externally determined road to socialism and 
said that the KPD believed in a uniquely German path to socialism. He declared, “We 
must enter upon that road in Germany which corresponds to the conditions of 
development in Germany, and this will not be exactly the same road as in other 
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countries.”24 Two points are worth underlining about this speech. First, Ulbricht framed 
the KPD approach to reconstruction in terms of anti-fascism rather than socialism. 
Second, he seemed to sense a fear that Soviet control of Eastern Germany meant that it 
would be Sovietized and responded by consistently stressing that Germany must find its 
own path to democracy. He was acknowledging the current struggles of Germany and in 
doing so was expressing solidarity with the German people.  Through this speech, Walter 
Ulbricht was trying to become a leader the German people could trust. 
Other non-Communist parties also emerged in June 1945 and challenged the 
political monopoly of the KPD, the most important of which were the Christian 
Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands; CDU) and the 
Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands; 
LDPD). The ideological motivation for the CDU was the belief that social behavior was 
inspired by the gospels and that it was a political and moral obligation to help unify the 
people.25 The CDU was initially a popular organization for Germans who had been 
involved in right-wing parties dissolved by the Allied Powers after World War II.26 
Despite its early popularity among right-wing Germans, the CDU was not well 
represented in the administration or later in elected bodies. Though Communists by 
nature are anti-clerical and not religious, it has been suggested that allowing the CDU to 
exist was a kind of demonstration to the rest of the world, specifically West Germany, 
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that there was democracy in the Eastern Zone.27 The CDU existed alongside other non-
Communist organizations and together helped to create this image of democracy. 
The other non-Communist party, the Liberal Democratic Party, was founded as a 
successor party to the several German liberal parties of the Weimar Republic. Howard 
Frost contrasts it to the CDU, which believed in a platform of social welfare. The LDPD 
was more interested in a free economy and limited government, while sustaining Western 
Christian culture.28 Because political parties of the right were not allowed to form at all 
after World War II, the CDU and the LDPD worked hard to draw members of the 
previously established right-wing parties into their ranks. The LDPD hoped that it would 
attract members who had been active in the Weimar years, but more members opted to 
join the CDU, hurting membership in the LDPD early in the postwar years. Historian 
Martin McCauley argues that many of the LDPD’s early problems stemmed from its lack 
of an official party program. It was centered around one political figure and accepted its 
role in the Soviet dominated Eastern Zone. This did not spur membership and therefore 
relegated it to the status of a less-influential party than the KPD or SPD.29 Ultimately, the 
revival of the non-Communist CDU and the LDPD in the summer of 1945 encouraged 
the formation of the anti-fascist bloc with the Communist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party in July 1945.   
These four political parties joined together on July 14, 1945 to announce that they 
were going to work together to solve the problems of Germany, which they defined as the 
existence of Nazi thought in Germany and the need for anti-fascist activity. Their 
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declaration reads, “The representatives of the four parties, notwithstanding the full 
mutual recognition of their independence, are resolved to solve these great problems with 
unanimous strength by uniting in a firm front of anti-fascist and democratic 
organizations.”30  Though the political parties differed in ideology, all of them gathered 
under the umbrella of an anti-fascist bloc to participate in German political life. These 
parties said that the “creation of an anti-fascist and democratic political order will be 
required if the life of the German nation is to be saved.”31 It was a powerful statement 
that demonstrated the urgent need to create a new Germany. The formation of the front 
was meant to show the world Germany’s level of commitment to creating a new 
democratic society for itself. 
 The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 brought together the three major Allies 
from World War II, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to discuss the 
fate of defeated Germany, focusing on the whole of Germany and not the separate details 
of each individual sector. The Big Three revealed a number  of important agreements “on 
the political and economic principles of a coordinated Allied policy toward defeated 
Germany…”32 Stating that the Allied powers intended to work together to reconstruct and 
unify Germany while each ally maintained its individual sector for the time being, they 
covered politics, economic principles, reparations, and the handling of war criminals. 
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Specifically, they called for demilitarization of Germany and the eradication of National 
Socialist influence on society “to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German 
political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international 
life by Germany.”33 Key words such as “peaceful” and “democratic” were utilized 
throughout the Potsdam Agreement. They helped stress the values the Allies wanted to 
instill in Germany. The Allied powers may have appeared unified on these values, but the 
East and the West divided on how they were actually defined.  
The Soviet Union had suffered huge human and industrial losses during the war. 
These losses seemed to explain the vengeful behavior of the Red Army in the part of 
Germany they occupied. Great Britain and the United States, remembering the mistakes 
after World War I, had renounced any reparations from Germany, but the Soviets 
demanded $10 billion dollars to help rebuild their broken economy.34 The Russians 
firmly believed that the taking of reparations should occur before any economic 
rehabilitation to ensure that Germany could not resume hostilities in the future.35 The 
Soviet Union remained steadfast about this condition because it had already started taking 
reparations before the formal discussions at Potsdam. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov, Stalin’s right hand man at the Potsdam Conference, admitted that by the time of 
the meeting the Soviet Union had already taken $300 million in reparations in the East 
Zone.36 These preemptive moves by the Soviet Union sparked some concern on the part 
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of the Western powers. British Prime Minister Atlee later said it had seemed to him that 
“as far as [Stalin] was concerned…[the German people] could all starve.”37 The Soviet 
Union proclaimed that it supported the creation of an anti-fascist democracy and that it 
had a genuine commitment to the growth of a Germany independent of the Soviet Union, 
but the Western powers continued to be concerned that the power of the Soviet Union 
over Germany was too great. American leaders believed that Soviet policy toward the 
reconstruction of Germany was just an attempt to facilitate future Soviet exploitation of 
the human and material resources of Germany.38 But because the agreement solidified the 
fact that the armies of the Allied powers were in place in their occupation zone, this 
created a tension between the Allies about efforts to maintain stability and agreeing on 
ways to work toward a more lasting peace in Germany. 
The suspicions among the Allies were effectively put aside to formally establish 
the Allied Control Council on August 30, 1945. The idea of an Allied Control Council 
had been discussed in February 1945 at the previous Big Three Conference in Yalta, but 
it was not until the Potsdam Conference that plans were confirmed. The Allied Control 
Council was meant to unify the Allied powers and commit them to a common goal to 
reconstruct Germany. A proclamation to the German people reiterated that the Allied 
Powers held supreme authority over Germany and that all matters affecting Germany 
were to be decided upon by the Control Council. It stated that “Any military laws, 
proclamations, orders, ordinances, notices, regulations and directives issued by or under 
the authority of the respective Commanders-in-Chief for their respective Zones of 
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Occupation are continued in force in their respective zones.”39 Through the Allied 
Control Council, Germany was governed as a single economic unit, but individual 
military administrations were given the responsibility in their own zones.40 The creation 
of the Allied Control Council showed a willingness on the part of the allies to work 
together to reconstruct Germany while giving each allied power jurisdiction over their 
individual zone. This gave the Soviet Military Administration some freedom in the 
construction of the East in its own image. 
 Efforts to merge the SPD and the KPD took place in the second half of 1945 and 
into 1946 heightened political tensions within the Soviet Zone. As the Communist Party 
watched the popularity of the Social Democratic Party grow after it was revived it 
became clear to them that the KPD needed to widen its base to retain political dominance, 
and that brought back the idea of a merger with the SPD. In order to make unity a 
possibility, the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD proposed a joint conference 
with the Social Democratic Party on December 20, 1945. Despite disagreements over the 
influence of the Soviet Military Administration, the two parties agreed that they 
envisioned the same future for Germany. This was enough to hold a preliminary 
conference to discuss a possible merger. As much as the SPD wanted to sort out and 
address past conflicts with the KPD, the December Conference was dominated by KPD 
insistence on discussion of the future. The SPD wanted to know the KPD stance on 
external influence on its party agenda, but this point was mostly ignored.41 At the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39Allied Control Council, “Control Council Proclamation No. 1: Establishment of the Control Council,” in 
Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954 (London: Oxford University Press. 1955), 59. 	  	  
40Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 9.	  	  
41Krisch, German Politics under Soviet Occupation, 134-137.	  	  	  
	   25 
Conference what distinguished the agendas of the two parties were their differences on 
how to think about unification. The SPD spoke of the necessity of uniting all German 
socialist workers, while the KPD focused on the leaders, praising the work that the Soviet 
Military Administration had done and the success that had been achieved by the anti-
fascist bloc.42 The December Conference did not produce a firm plan for the future 
unification, but the SPD agreed that discussions could continue. Otto Grotewohl 
expressed the SPD’s stance in his proclamation after the Conference, saying that the 
representatives of both parties had laid the foundation for future unanimity in the 
development of a unified German worker’s party.43 His conciliatory tone signaled the 
unification to come in the near future.  
The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands; 
SED) was formed four months later, at a convention on April 21-22, 1946 of both the 
KPD and the SPD.44 In the proclamation of aims and principles of the Socialist Unity 
Party, one can see the outline of a German road to socialism. Walter Ulbricht had said 
that the German people were not ready for socialism. The creation of a unified working 
class party signaled to the members of the KPD and the SPD that their leaders now 
thought it was possible to work toward socialism in Germany. The united party issued a 
proclamation of principal aims, declaring: “The working class alone has a great historical 
aim: socialism. The future therefore belongs to it, together with all of the working men 
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and women.”45 Though the Soviet Zone of Occupation was not expressly mentioned, in 
that this was a proclamation for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, it can be inferred 
that the party leaders were really speaking of the East German zone. The immediate goal 
was an anti-fascist, democratic Germany, led by a government of all the anti-fascist 
democratic parties. The statement affirmed that the SED was committed to working 
through the political process, but it did recognize the possibility of revolution if the 
capitalists tried to prevent democratic change from taking place: “The Socialist Unity 
Party of Germany aims at the achievement of socialism by democratic means; but it will 
resort to revolutionary means if the capitalist class departs from the basis of 
democracy.”46 Previously there had been no mention of revolutionary means on the road 
to socialism in Germany, so that was a significant change in the rhetoric of the left. The 
SED was indicating that force was a possibility in the event that democracy faced class 
opposition using undemocratic means. The merger of the working class parties creating 
the SED accelerated the Soviet Zone along a path to socialism.   
 On the outside, the founding of the SED appeared to be a genuine step forward in 
the development of democratic politics in Germany. The proclamations of the SED 
leadership about the future of Germany suggested there could be a new unified 
government drawn from the left. Wolfgang Leonhard found great the hope in the air at 
the convention. There was a sense that with the foundation of the SED the German 
socialists were going to have independence from Russian control. They could actually set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Socialist Unity Party of Germany, “Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. 21 
April 1946,” in Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-1954 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 121.  
46Socialist Unity Party of Germany, “Principles and Aims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany,” 123-
124.	  
	   27 
out on the road to socialism tailored to Germany, founded on their own traditions, and 
free from the restrictions of Soviet occupation. He notes that,  
Everything seemed to point to the fulfilment of our wishes: the equal composition 
of the leadership [of the SED], the admonitory words about the comradeship and 
mutual confidence, which Pieck had addressed to the Communists; Grotewohl’s 
insistence on freedom of the personality in the new Party; the thesis of a separate 
German road to socialism, which had found its echo in the SED programme; and 
Grotewohl’s hints of the possibility of an early end to Soviet occupation.47 
 
Leonhard was expressing the hope that the formation of the SED would bring good things 
to Germany, but in saying everything “seemed” to point to these things he touched on the 
issues that later divided him from the KPD/SED. Though the SED appeared strong, there 
was much political infighting that gave it a weak foundation. The SED was ultimately a 
façade to appease the politically active left and, in fact, as time passed the KPD, backed 
by the power of the Soviet Military Administration, increasingly exerted more power 
within the SED. 
 The unification of the SPD and the KPD into the SED was a momentous occasion 
for the Soviet Zone. Despite the excitement about this development, the creation of the 
SED made the West more suspicious of Soviet aims in the East. Ulbricht addressed this 
issue in a speech about the strategy and aims of the SED in October 1946: 
Some working class people in West Germany consider the Socialist Democratic 
Party of Germany a party of the Soviet Union. Although the creation of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany began in the Soviet Occupation Zone, it has 
become the leading force of the working people in the whole of Germany. For it 
has shown the working class and the working people throughout Germany the 
path to the rebirth of the German working-class movement and also created a 
great example of the unification of the two streams of the German working-class 
movement for West and South Germany.48  
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This speech was one of the first times Ulbricht directly referenced the West as distinct 
from the East. He acknowledged Western criticism of his party and its dependence upon 
the occupying Soviets, but sought to dispel that charge. As in his other postwar speeches, 
Ulbricht drew the message back to the unity and empowerment of the working class, a 
message that he promoted throughout his career in the GDR. The reference to the West, if 
brief, recognized the growing tensions that were rising to the surface between the Allied 
Forces. These tensions became all the more important as local provincial (Land) elections 
took place later that October throughout the Soviet Zone, most importantly the elections 
in East Berlin scheduled for October 20.   
 The SED undertook a zone-wide initiative to improve its reputation among the 
people. Public debates effectively spread information on the party’s political aims.  In 
September 1946 the SED’s newspaper Neues Deutschland published the proclamation 
entitled “Basic Rights of the German People – The Path to German Unity” in which the 
party aim of unifying Germany was meant to draw many people to the party. These zone-
wide local elections were held in order to reestablish political life in Eastern Germany 
and probably to give the new SED legitimacy as the ruling party. The SED held elections 
throughout the Soviet Zone outside of Berlin in October 1946 on the assumption that a 
decisive victory in the rest of the Zone would bolster enthusiasm for the party in the 
capital, where the KPD and the SPD had not merged. Otto Grotewohl emphasized that an 
SED victory in these elections was important not just for the Soviet Zone, but for all of 
Germany. These local elections were the stepping stones to the creation of an all German 
government. Despite all these efforts to boost its own image, the party still did not 
manage to win a majority in the October 1946 elections. After the October local 
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elections, it was clear that the SED had support among the working class, but not enough 
to gain an overall majority. The other parties in the election, the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), had held their own 
and prevented the SED from achieving an overall majority. Worse still, in the elections in 
Berlin on October 20, 1946, the SPD won a decisive victory over the Communist SED.49 
Wolfgang Leonhard states that the SPD won a decisive 48.7% of the vote in Berlin, while 
the CDU came second with 22.1%, and the SED was in third with a mere 19.8%.50 These 
defeats across the Soviet Zone forced the SED to reconsider its tactics once again, 
ultimately driving it along stricter, more Soviet lines. 
 The decisive defeat of the SED in the October elections sparked a change in the 
SED’s public image. Wolfgang Leonhard attributed the SED loss in the 1946 elections to 
its close relationship with the Soviet Union. The German people associated the SED with 
the Russians and to them the Russians were occupiers, not necessarily allies. The SED 
was dependent upon the Soviet Military Administration and many of the main leaders 
had close ties to Moscow, which they used as they worked to establish themselves in the 
Soviet Zone, but this only served to hurt them with the general public. The Berlin vote 
suggested that German people wanted to define their own path for their future, not 
something that was determined by a foreign power. Leonhard saw the development of the 
SED after the 1946 elections as being, unfortunately, “not toward greater independence, 
but exactly the opposite, their links with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Occupation 
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authorities became stronger.”51 If the SED had been in tune with its constituents and 
genuinely believed in a democratic road to socialism, then they would not have 
strengthened their relationship with the Soviet Union. It serves to show that the SED was 
in fact significantly dominated by the KPD, and these men chose to align themselves only 
more closely with the Soviet Union after their political upset and at a time of increasing 
tension between East and West. The elections of 1946 marked a turning point for the 
SED. It had now chosen to hold on to its socialism agenda and that choice had the effect 
of separating them from the people and making them dependent on the Soviet Union. 
 The relationship between the SED and the Soviet Union grew even stronger as 
relations among the Allies grew increasingly hostile. One of the main reasons for the 
tension between the Soviet Union and Western powers was President Harry Truman’s 
announcement in early 1947, later known as the Truman Doctrine, which seemed clearly 
directed at the Soviet Union. 
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian 
regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States 
has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the 
Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria…At the present moment in 
world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. 
The choice is often not a free one…I believe it must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures.52  
 
The Soviet Union was never directly named, but it was clear that President Truman was 
referring to its aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe and the East Mediterranean. In 
saying that the Yalta agreement had been violated, the United States was suggesting a 
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new development in the relationship between the East and the West, one that recognized 
neither of the former Allies intended to carry out the agreements made during and after 
World War II, a fact that had been obvious to the Soviet Union for a while and now was 
becoming apparent to the United States. The subsequent announcement of the Marshall 
Plan in June 1947, to be put into effect in Germany starting in 1948, only intensified the 
hostilities. The Marshall Plan was initiated by the United States as a means of funding 
European recovery and encouraging democracy. It aimed to start economic growth in 
Europe so it could become a strong, prosperous, and democratic region. The Soviet 
Union took this generous measure by the United States as a reaction to its policies in the 
East. It saw the Marshall Plan as an effort to isolate and push the Soviet Union out of the 
joint work of the Allied powers in Germany.  
 The SED was equally appalled by the developments in the West. The Soviet Zone 
was not directly mentioned in the Truman Doctrine, but as a people occupied by the 
Soviet Union it felt included in the denunciations from the West. Though the two parts of 
Germany were theoretically still working together toward unification of Germany, the 
Soviet Zone could not help but feel attacked by the West Allies. In a heated response, 
Otto Grotewohl declared,  
So far only the Soviet Union has consistently carried out these unanimous Allied 
decisions, while the Western Allies have moved farther and farther away from 
them…The punishment and expropriation of war criminals and active Nazis, the 
break up of the economic dictatorship and war policy of the big banks and 
monopoly firms, the implementation of land reform are the only possible bases 
for the final elimination of a catastrophic German policy and for the long overdue 
restoration of peace. If the Western occupying powers do not carry out these 
decisions…this will lead to the renewal of reactionary trends in Germany…53 
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This was simultaneously a defense of the policies being carried out in the Soviet Zone 
and an attack against the West. The West might think that the East was becoming 
totalitarian, but Grotewohl argued that the progress being made in the Soviet Zone of 
Germany was lasting. The reforms in the Soviet Zone might seem drastic, but they were 
necessary to completely eliminate the extremism perpetuated by the Nazi Party. These 
denunciations of actions carried out in either the Western Zone or the Eastern Zone 
signaled the worsening relationship between the two super powers.  
Political scientist Zbigniew K. Brezezinski argued in 1960 that there was a 
standard pattern for development in the Soviet Bloc after World War II and that the 
reforms in the Soviet Zone of Germany fit his pattern quite well. Despite the individual 
characteristics defining each country, Brzezinski saw a series of stages in the 
consolidation of power in places of Soviet occupation. The first phase was relatively 
democratic with the old regime and its social allies eliminated because they were said to 
be Nazis/Fascists or collaborators. The new states were called People’s Democracies. 
There were multiple parties participating in the political process and active 
encouragement of democratizing internal reforms. In the second stage, the bourgeois and 
peasant parties, the Church, and other centers of opposition to the Communist rule were 
gradually pushed out and opposition parties stifled or absorbed into Communist-
dominated popular fronts. There was increasing control of the cultural arena and limits on 
intellectual freedom and by 1947-1948 the creation of a one-party system of 
government.54  
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The political role of the Soviet Union in the People’s Democracies increased 
during the development of the Soviet Bloc, increasing separation from the West and also 
increasing integration of the Bloc. In 1947, the Yugoslav Communist Party wanted more 
exchange of ideas to take place among the different parties of the Soviet Bloc. This 
exchange of knowledge would help bolster the strength of their party after a weak 
showing in national elections throughout the past year. From this request came the idea 
for the Cominform. In the small village of Szklarska Poreba, Poland the new international 
organization was inaugurated. The creation of the Cominform in September 1947 
solidified the Soviet dominated countries. The establishment of the Cominform began to 
create more common patterns of development for the Communist parties in the Eastern 
countries. These countries moved closer to sovietization. Brezezinski argues that for 
Eastern European Communist parties the formation of the Cominform signaled the 
beginnings of the transformation to Stalinism.55 In Germany we can see in the events of 
1946 and early 1947 that it was beginning to move from the first stage of anti-fascist 
democratic politics, relatively open culture, and some openness in relations with Western 
Germany and the Western Allies toward a de facto one-party rule and isolation from the 
West. For the SED the possibility of a uniquely German path to socialism was eliminated 
and it too began to head down a road of sovietization. 
 The Soviet Zone of Germany was not directly linked to the Cominform, as it was 
not a sovereign country, but the organization had significance for the later creation of the 
German Democratic Republic in 1949. The Cominform’s creation indicated that the kind 
of political developments that were taking place in the Soviet Zone of Germany were 
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taking place not only there. Radical leanings to the left were taking place all across 
Eastern Europe. It was clearly a trend and therefore highlights the way the policies in 
East Germany sprang from its parent, the Soviet Union. The KPD continued to insist that 
Germany had an individual path to follow, one that passed through an antifascist, 
democratic stage. But the influence of the Soviet Union and the international Communist 
community proved stronger than the local communist vision. If Wolfgang Leonhard’s 
memories are considered, the Soviet Union always dominated the relationship with the 
KPD and the transition to a more Soviet-style socialism was an easy consequence. This 
suggests that little coercion was involved in the process of bringing East Germany into 
the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, he suggests a genuine excitement about the creation of 
the SED and what it meant for Germany. It was a uniquely German political party, but it 
was soon subordinated to the Soviet Union. The relationship between the KPD and the 
Soviet Union is difficult to assess and a lot is left up to speculation. It seems safe to say, 
though, that East Germany quite early met the same fate as the other countries of the 
Soviet Bloc, and not just despite its interest in independent German development, but 
precisely because it was on the front lines of the Cold War and the Soviets deemed the 
region vital to its defense.  
A year after the establishment of the Cominform in 1947 Walter Ulbricht declared 
that the SED represented a Party of a New Type. He said that by 1948 the SED was 
reconstructing itself to fit the demands of the working class. He claimed that the work 
done up until 1948 had been strong and benefitted Germany, but said there was still work 
to be done. He directly addressed the hostilities between the East and the West by 
declaring that in reconstruction plans for the Western Zones of Germany, “…the USA is 
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striving for the implementation of further aggressive designs.”56 Conversely, he said that 
the Soviet Union was the only state that genuinely supported the struggle of the working 
class people and that stood for peace and free development of production. Therefore, he 
said, gaining the confidence and friendship of the Soviet Union was central to the 
stability of Germany and that led him to talk about the Party of a New Type, which 
clearly was meant to be a Leninist party. According to Ulbricht the new type of party 
“can only fulfill its tasks on the basis of democratic centralism, with unified party 
statutes, a unified party discipline and a unified party leadership, which mediates the line 
of party policy to the masses through its central newspaper.”57 Unlike in the early years 
of occupation when such direct language was avoided by the KPD, with the political 
developments that had ensued over three and a half years since the end of the war, 
Ulbricht felt it necessary to use strong language, to openly declare East Germany’s 
alliance with the Soviet Union and to embrace the Soviet model.  
By 1948, ties between East and West were breaking down and actions were taken 
that later led to the creation of distinctly different Germanies. The Marshall Plan was set 
to begin in 1948 and the United States said it would help inspire the democratic 
development of Germany. But the Marshall Plan and the vague plans by the United States 
to create a government for Germany led the Soviet Union to claim that the Potsdam 
Conference agreements had been broken. The Allied Control Council met for the last 
time in March 1948. During the meeting the Director of the Soviet Military 
Administration, Vasily Sokolovsky (1897-1968), accused the West of trying to force 
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capitalism on the German people, which ran counter to agreements made at Potsdam, and 
he walked out. The Allied Control Council was in effect finished.58 Unilateral currency 
reform on the part of the Western zones led the Soviets to blockade the land routes to the 
Allied Zones in Berlin in June 1948. Finally, in September 1949, the Western Zones of 
Germany were given independence through the creation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland; BRD), with its capital in Bonn. This action was 
followed rapidly by the announcement on October 7 of a German state in the Soviet 
Zone, the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik; DDR).  
 The creation of the DDR meant that East Germany was now a sovereign state, and  
was leaving behind its status of occupation.59 The announcement that East Germany was 
to become independent contained harsh attacks on West Germany and the Western 
powers that supported it: 
…[O]n Friday the democratic Germany will take the first step towards the 
restoration of its sovereignty, independence, and freedom, while the undemocratic 
Germany at Bonn, the rump of Germany of the war-mongers and the dividers…, 
of the Hitlerian armaments magnates and large estate owners, continues in the 
hopeless perspective of enduring occupation and economic dependence.60 
 
The new German Democratic Republic put itself forward as the ideal Germany of the 
future. It did not think the West had held it up to the standards of the Potsdam Agreement 
laid out in August 1945. The Soviet Military Administration announced that it transferred 
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its power to the Provisional Government of the DDR.61 Though the German Democratic 
Republic claimed itself sovereign, in 1949 and in the future it would be subordinate to the 
Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Union still maintained a military presence in the DDR, and 
helped the SED remain in power. The declaration of the formation of the German 
Democratic Republic was the final stage in the evolution of the Soviet Zone of Germany 
from being dominated by one ideology to domination by another, from National Socialist 
ideology under the Third Reich to Marxist-Leninist ideology under the SED.  
 The political development of the Soviet Zone of Germany began as a seemingly 
genuine attempt to create an anti-fascist, democratic Germany, which became 
transformed into a process of sovietization. In the merger of the SPD and the KPD one 
can see the early beginnings of this transformation. The Communist members of the SED 
insisted that they ought to rule over the Soviet Zone and bring Germany to socialism by 
following a specifically German path, but they needed the power and the support of the 
Soviet Union to do so and thus needed to follow the orders of the Soviet representatives 
in Germany. The KPD’s obvious reverence for the Soviet Union and their simultaneous 
scorn for the West narrowed their thinking and led them to follow closely the Soviet 
pattern of development. Both the German Communists and their Soviet Allies played a 
part in the Soviet Zone’s political transformation from National Socialism into a socialist 
state and neither can be exempt from responsibility for what became of East Germany. 
The divergent and increasingly hostile relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
Western powers also contributed to the transformation of the East. The Allied Control 
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Council was effective in the first years after the war in organizing reconstruction activity, 
but differing views about how development should proceed and breaches of the Potsdam 
Conference by both sides brought the Allied Control Council to an end. The increasing 
distance between East and West and the close relationship of East Germany leaders to the 
Soviet Union set the people of East Germany on a path away from their National 
Socialist past but toward a socialist future.
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Chapter 2: 
 
Purges of National Socialists  
 
Before the war ended, the Allied powers discussed the necessity of de-
Nazification at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Then, at the Potsdam Conference 
in July 1945, the Allies gave specifics to the process of de-Nazification. The Allies 
agreed that it was central to rooting out the Nazi ideology from Germany. At first the 
Allies worked together to implement de-Nazification, but in practice, the East and the 
West began to diverge. The Soviet Union applied de-Nazification measures more 
rigorously than in the West. All high officials in society were purged from positions of 
power. After the start of de-Nazification the Soviet Military Administration of Germany 
began to transform the process into a more rehabilitative and integrative program. By this 
process, followers of the Nazi regime were to be assimilated back into society so that 
they could contribute to the development of a new Germany. The physical removal of 
former Nazis from postwar German society may have failed to root out many Nazi 
sympathizers and even a handful of leaders, but the process as a whole helped emphasize 
the need to reconstruct society. This was a process instituted by the Soviet Military 
Administration and carried out by German Communist cadres, which demonstrates the 
relationship between these two forces.   
Germans were removed from office because of suspected affiliation with the Nazi 
Party or because of collaboration with the Nazis. The Allied Powers agreed on the 
concept of de-Nazification and also agreed on purges of the most active Nazi 
collaborators. They needed to “destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and 
supervised organizations, to dissolve Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived 
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in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.”1 Each zone 
had a different way of carrying out its initial purges. The United States and Great Britain 
mostly used questionnaires to assess a German’s Nazi past. The United States surveyed 
Germans ages eighteen and older, while the British only made Germans fill them out if 
they were employed or seeking to be employed. Internment camps were used to detain 
Nazis. Among the British, these internment camps held a bad reputation as torture camps 
for former Nazis. The other Western Allies felt it broke the moral standard they wanted to 
set.2 The French were not as apt to use the questionnaires, but they were known to 
imprison former Nazis. The French wanted to “purify” the German people as opposed to 
what they considered the harshness of the term “denazify.” Historian Frederick Taylor 
believes that they wanted to impart their French republican rationalism on the German 
people.3 Finally the Soviets, the focus of this thesis, were were often considered the most 
aggressive of the occupying powers because of the level of force and aggression put into 
de-Nazification. They removed suspected Nazis from positions of power and asked 
questions later. A closer comparison between the approaches of the West and the East 
will serve to distinguish the severity of de-Nazification between the two sides.  
The Fragebogen (questionnaire) was used most widely in the American sector. 
The Americans were reported to have handed out around 13 million Fragebogen to 
Germans eighteen years or older, including those whom the Americans deemed 
questionable and those Germans seeking employment. Many of the questions asked 
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Germans to report their actions one or two decades previously, such as how they voted in 
the 1932 election, which not all remembered or wanted to remember.4 Until the Germans 
completed and returned their Fragebögen they were unable to work and unable to obtain 
ration tickets for food.5 In effect, they were in an American-induced purgatory. The 
American goal was simply to purge the German Nazi ideology from the political realm. 
Germans who were asked to fill out these questionnaires were usually removed from their 
jobs preemptively and could not return to their job until the questionnaire came back 
showing they were not true Nazis. This process could take months. This left many 
families without a proper income.6 The mixed goals of the Fragebögen highlight some of 
the problems that characterized the process of de-Nazification in the US zone.   
In the Soviet Zone the Military Administration sought to eradicate all traces of 
Nazi power, as well as Nazi ideology. Taylor argues that the methods implemented in the 
West were bad, but those in the East were lethal.7 Once the Ulbricht group landed in 
Berlin in early May, the Soviet Union and the KPD worked together to oust Nazis from 
power and implant politically reliable Germans at the helm of all administrations.8 The 
Soviet Union was overall more aggressive in its purge of Nazis from power. 
Questionnaires were distributed, but the Soviets were more in the habit of physically 
removing people from positions of power without asking questions. The Soviets placed 
real and perceived Nazis in internment camps or Gulags, where conditions were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: The Brutal History of Allied Occupation (New York: Basic Books, 
2009), 344-345.  
5MacDonogh, After the Reich, 348.  
6Taylor, Exorcising Hitler, 268.   
7Taylor, Exorcising Hitler, 323-324.    
8MacDonogh, After the Reich, 348.	  
	   42 
torturous.9 It was clear from the actions of the Russians in the first few months after the 
war that they were out for retribution against the Nazis. 
Walter Ulbricht, Secretary of the German Communist Party, called on the German 
people to help the Soviet Union rebuild Germany by accepting their guilt. He said that 
through accepting their guilt, Germans could begin the process of uprooting Nazism from 
society. Only if the German people felt shame and genuine remorse for their actions 
could they have the courage to start down a road to democracy.10 Ulbricht advocated an 
aggressive approach to de-Nazification in the Soviet Zone, and supported a widespread 
purge throughout the zone to eliminate former Nazis from positions of power in May 
1945, which required “the cleaning of administrative departments in each state and 
municipality…[and] the removal of all men involved in business and banking who are 
held responsible for the war and fascism…”11 The German people could only endure if 
they “[created] a democratic administration and through the maintenance of open and 
friendly relations, for the Soviet Union especially, opened themselves up to other 
peoples.”12 Ulbricht provided more direction for his group of Communist followers on 
the aim of de-Nazification and the hiring of anti-fascist Germans not previously in the 
government to administrative positions. The task of the KPD was “[to] tour the various 
districts of Berlin to try and pick out those democratic anti-fascists who are best suited to 
build up the new German regime.” Ulbricht sought men from a variety of political parties 
in order to create the anti-fascist, democratic administration he promoted. It was the goal 
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of the KPD to build German agencies for self-government in Berlin and an administration 
with a variety of political representatives would jump start this reconstruction effort.13  
The KPD attempted to capitalize on the need for reconstruction of society by 
trying to take some control over Germany’s de-Nazification process. In July 1945 it 
drafted, along with the other active political parties in the Soviet Zone, the Richtlinien für 
die strengste Bestrafung der Naziverbrecher und Sühnemaßnahmen gegen aktivistische 
Nazis (Guidelines for the strongest punishment of the Nazi criminals and sanctions 
against active Nazis) to provide more clarity about the de-Nazification process in 
Germany.14 In this document, Nazi criminals and Nazi supporters were held responsible 
for causing the war and for creating Fascist ideology. The KPD also proposed a program 
for the reeducation and rehabilitation of former Nazis in democratic ideals. Its definition 
of an active Nazi was in accordance with that determined by the Allied powers, but some 
of its sanctions for these active Nazis were unique, such as the removal of other job 
benefits, non-cash benefits, and cash benefits as well as the barring of the political right 
from becoming members in trade unions, trade associations or in the anti-fascist 
democratic parties.15 These guidelines in effect prevented active Nazis from taking part in 
society and from being able to receive anything from society in return. Germans were 
clearly interested in reconstructing society completely free of Nazis and the guidelines 
the anti-fascist bloc sets out show the height of their ambition for a thorough de-
Nazification of society. 
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The Soviet Military Administration, however, refused to release the KPD 
guidelines to the public. Historian Timothy Vogt suggests a couple of reasons for this 
decision. The primary reason might have been that the development of these guidelines 
coincided with the completion of the Potsdam Agreement. If these two documents were 
released together, the Allied leadership might have thought that the Soviet Union was not 
following the jointly agreed on policies and was separating itself from the other Allies. 
Thus the Soviet Military Administration instructed the Germans to stay in line with the 
four power resolutions of the Allies. The other reason Vogt suggests as an explanation for 
the Soviet Military Administration’s effort to delay the release of the Guidelines is that 
the Soviet Military Administration did not yet trust the KPD enough to let it organize and 
run its own de-Nazification process. The Soviet Military Administration was also not yet 
sufficiently organized to monitor processes if they let another party, the KPD, control 
them.16  
The Soviets were searching for a workable policy. They didn’t trust the KPD 
enough to assist them in carrying out de-Nazification. Instead, the Soviet Military 
Administration began to employ other methods to eradicate the Nazi presence in its zone 
and to identify who the former Nazis and collaborators. The Soviets required German 
adults to register with the Soviet Military Administration representative in their locality.17 
The specifics of registration came through Order No. 42, issued on August 27, 1945. It 
stated that all former members of the German Army of the rank lieutenant and higher, all 
former members of the SS and SA, employees of the Gestapo and members of the 
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NSDAP had to register with the Soviet Military Command in their province without 
exception by September 25, 1945. Those who did not register by the due date or 
attempted to conceal their guilt were to be held responsible for their actions.18 Germans 
who registered were put to work by the Soviet Military Administration, conducting the 
physical labor in removal of rubble and reconstruction, or given other labor intensive 
jobs. Timothy Vogt sees the registration process as critical in two aspects. In the short 
term, registration was structurally necessary to find out who the Nazis were so it would 
be possible to purge those who had held responsible positions. In the long term, this 
allowed administrators of the de-Nazification process to distinguish active Nazis from 
potentially nominal Nazis, all of which contributed to the development of East Germany 
toward a society free of National Socialist influence.19  
 The registration of Nazis in each municipality was accompanied by expropriation 
of their property. Expropriation often took place at the local level, with individual 
activists seizing the property of businesses run by Nazis or even their personal property. 
In Brandenburg, a suspected Nazi had all the furniture in his apartment confiscated and it 
later appeared in the offices of the local KPD. Citizens were incensed that such 
confiscations were being used for personal gain.20 On a larger scale, suspected Nazis 
were being completely displaced. Timothy Vogt mentions a case in the village of 
Breddin, where eleven families were ejected from their homes and forced to leave the 
district in which they lived. Situations such as theft of property and displacement became 
so frequent that the Soviet Military Administration issued Order No. 124 on October 30, 
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1945 to try and control what was going on. The order provided criteria for what property 
could be confiscated and specifically mentioned that any property that belonged to “the 
German state and its central and local agencies; the functionaries of the National Socialist 
Party, its leading members and influential followers; the German military authorities and 
organizations; the societies, clubs, and associations prohibited and dissolved by the 
Soviet Military Command; the governments and nationals of the countries involved in the 
war on the side of Germany; and persons indicted by the Soviet Military Administration 
by special lists or in other ways.”21 These guidelines were meant to protect the small 
businesses and property owners subjected to harsh actions by local authorities and instead 
focused the attacks on those deemed real Nazis, though making this distinction proved 
difficult throughout the entire de-Nazification process.22 
Finally, the Allied Control Council in Berlin issued Directive 24 in January 1946 
to establish order to the de-Nazification process. This was a joint decree of the Allies to 
help bring structure to the purges taking place across Germany. Directive 24 became 
central to the policy of de-Nazification. It ordered that:  
All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in 
its activities…be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions 
of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced 
by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of 
assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions.23 
 
But the language of Directive 24 was vague and gave each Allied power the opportunity 
to interpret the directive individually. There was no indication of how former Nazis 
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should be removed and no discussion of how they would, or if they would, be 
reintegrated back into society. It was also up to each individual zone to determine who 
was morally upright and who wanted to assist in the democratic development of society. 
The Allied Control Council distinguished between an “active” and a “nominal” Nazi. The 
general definition of a “more than nominal” or active Nazi was a person who had: 
“held office and otherwise been active at any level from local to national in the 
party and its subordinate organizations or in organizations which further 
militaristic doctrines…authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi 
crimes, racial persecutions or discriminations…been avowed believers in Nazism 
or racial and militaristic creeds…or, voluntarily given substantial moral or 
material support or political assistance of any kind to the Nazi Party of Nazi 
officials and leaders.”24 
 
It was the job of each Allied Zone then to decide which Germans they considered active 
members of the Nazi Party and which ones they deemed nominal or non-threatening to 
the new Germany. The Allies agreed that if the person was “of such minor importance 
that the incumbent or appointee is not placed in a position to endanger Allied interests or 
commit acts hostile to Allied principles” then each Zone could decide who was an active 
Nazi and who was a nominal Nazi.25 These two Allied directives gave structure to the 
definition of de-Nazification while still allowing the Soviet Union the freedom to carry 
out these measures as they wanted. 
 The Soviet Union initially did not favor Directive 24 because by this time its own 
practice was to forcibly remove people from their property and jobs, but they acquiesced 
to the Allied Control Council’s decision in an effort to remain in good favor with the 
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other powers. Directive 24 was the official approach to the de-Nazification process across 
Germany, but in practice the Soviet Military Administration utilized the vague language 
of Directive 24 to continue to carry out the removal of former Nazis on its own terms. It 
approached de-Nazification by creating commissions led by politically reliable Germans 
appointed by the Soviet Military Administration in 1946. Similar approaches were being 
taken by the other Allies powers, but the emphasis on political reliability was unique to 
the Soviet Zone.  
These Soviet Zone commissions acted on the cases of the large number of Nazis 
and Nazi supporters who still held property or were low level officials in the public and 
semi-public institutions. Orders from the central administration controlled these 
commissions and applied evenly across the Zone. The commissions in the Soviet Zone 
dealt with all public and semi-public officials, but they only had power over issues of 
employment. Germans were reviewed case by case and decisions were made in 
accordance with Directive 24, including those Germans who had already been dismissed 
in the initial purges of 1945. The de-Nazification commission hearings sometimes gave 
people a second chance to prove their commitment to the new society, but most often it 
was merely a discussion which reinforced their past connection to the Nazi party.26  The 
establishment of these de-Nazification commissions made the process of de-Nazification 
in the Soviet Zone appear more orderly because instead of the abrupt dismissals that had 
characterized the first months after the war, individual cases were reviewed and each was 
given equal consideration.  
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The de-Nazification commissions had the effect of standardizing the de-
Nazification process, but the attitudes that Germans had developed during the early 
postwar period caused frustration for the commissioners. Richard Bessel speaks of the 
exhaustion of the German population after the war and about their apathy toward politics. 
He argues they had resigned themselves to their fate as an occupied people and became 
more concerned with their own personal trials and tribulations.27 This political apathy 
showed up in the anti-fascist commission meetings when former Nazi Party members 
seemed willing to testify both to their past sins and the new way they had now embraced. 
It was a kind of passive compliance that Timothy Vogt suggests stemmed from general 
disillusionment with the de-Nazification process. Commissioners most often asked about 
the individual’s commitment to the SED and the Soviet Union. A lack of enthusiasm for 
these two aspects of the Soviet Zone culture often led commissioners to suggest that the 
individual was still an active Nazi. While trying to uncover the extent to which Nazis and 
other German citizens were repentant, though, it became nearly impossible to determine 
whether petitioners actually believed what they said because it was clear that they knew 
what they were supposed to say.28 It would have been unintelligent on the part of the 
accused to challenge the established political authority of the Soviet Military 
Administration and the SED. It was easier for the people to accept their placement in 
society by these de-Nazification commissions than to confront the commissions’ powers 
or biases. 
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 The following example from Vogt’s book demonstrates the overt prompting of 
suspected Nazis in the de-Nazification commissions. Vogt uses interrogations of factory 
workers who had joined the Nazi Party in the 1940s to demonstrate this point. One such 
interrogation goes as follows: 
 Chairman: Have you attended political meetings? 
 Answer: I always attend them. 
 Chairman: What are the differences between the east and the west zones? 
 Answer: The reconstruction is moving forward here in a democratic way. 
 Chairman: Say it more precisely. 
 Answer: Production increases month by month. 
 Chairman: But there are other developments. 
 Answer: The workers are cared for.29 
 
Vogt continues after this quote to note the “current of superficiality” that ran through 
these interrogations. These interrogations were almost ritualistic in nature. They seem to 
prompt the person being interrogated toward the correct answer. This supports the 
argument that Germans being interrogated knew what to say. Therefore, it cannot be 
known whether these interrogations can be considered to have been effective in making 
Germans distance themselves from their Nazi past and become enthusiastic participants 
of a new socialist society. On the contrary, it seems apparent that Germans simply 
accepted their fate.  
A key exception to the strict policies of de-Nazification was often seen in the 
treatment of children. They were deemed too young to be held accountable for their 
actions and therefore were not subject to interrogation by the de-Nazification 
commissions. In early 1947, as the de-Nazification process began to change, the SED 
representatives of the Soviet Zone Länder created a law saying that all children born after 
January 1, 1919, or “year one” of the Hitler youth generation, were not to be punished for 
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their past affiliations and so were to be treated as equal citizens in all matters of social, 
economic, and political life. Most of this generation had participated as children in the 
Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) or the Bund Deutscher Mädel (League of German Girls) 
because enrollment in these groups was mandatory for youths. But though enrollment 
was mandatory, active participation was not. Therefore, the new laws explicitly did not 
apply to those who had been members of the SS or the SA, or higher functionaries of the 
Hitler Youth, those with a rank of Unterbannführer or higher and BDM functionaries of 
the rank Ringführerin or higher.30 Having held these ranks indicated a high level of 
commitment to the organization that went beyond compulsory participation. Overall, the 
SED made the choice not to subject many children to the same punishments as the older 
generations of Germans because of the mandatory enrollment policy.  
The de-Nazification commissions were effective in systematically removing 
former Nazis from society, but a level of uncertainty remained throughout the process. 
The commissioners could never know whether the individual under review was genuinely 
guilty for past actions. There was no telling how much remorse the German people felt, 
because of the apathy prevalent in society. Despite these built-in uncertainties, intensive 
measures to carry out Directive 24 probably arose from the Soviet Military 
Administration’s urge to avenge the destructive acts of the German army in the Soviet 
Union during the war. The physical removal of suspected Nazis and the beginnings of 
reconstruction in German society allowed the Soviet Union to exert power over 
Germany, which was viewed as equivalent to what was taken away from the Russians by 
the German army during the war. Whether Germans felt a sense of guilt or not was 
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probably irrelevant to the Soviet leaders because they trusted so few Germans. Removing 
a large number of Germans thought to have dubious loyalties was preferred to allowing 
too many to be active in German society. Though the physical removal of people from 
society may seem harsh, it was deemed a necessary step in the larger efforts to rebuild 
Germany.  
But soon, the Soviet Military Administration and the SED came to the realization 
that there were too many former Nazis to remove all of them physically from society and 
so began to transition from a policy of retribution to one of rehabilitation. Instead of 
purging individuals from positions in the German administration, the Soviet Military 
Administration began to think it was more important to show them a new path to 
democracy. Not everyone could be held responsible for the acts of the Nazi Party and 
there needed to be a certain level of trust in the German people. The Soviet Military 
Administration began to diverge from the Western Allies when they started the process of 
rehabilitation. It became a process of rehabilitation toward socialism. Through the 
implementation of the new orders to distinguish different levels of complicity with the 
Nazi party and methods to integrate different professions back into society, the Soviet 
Military Administration and the KPD started to reconstruct society in their image.  
Many Germans argued they only learned of the atrocities committed by the Nazi 
Party once the war had ended. This claimed ignorance led many Germans to accept the 
accusation of “general responsibility,” although not all were willing to believe they were 
truly guilty.31 A German woman writing about the problems of surviving in Berlin in the 
weeks right after the fall of the Nazi regime described many of her fellow Germans. She 
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recounted how common it was for people to denounce Adolf Hitler and claim they never 
supported the party. Ultimately they had all “breathed what was in the air, and it affected 
all of us, even if we didn’t want it to.”32 As much as the German people wanted to 
distance themselves from the acts of the Nazi Party, their participation in the horrors of 
the Third Reich, active or passive could not be ignored. The reality of living under the 
Nazi regime was complex and there were many degrees of support, ranging from 
acquiescence to full collaboration. After the issuance of Allied Control Council Directive 
No. 24 and an influx of de-Nazification interrogations taken on by the commissions, the 
Allied powers worked to distinguish between “active” Nazis and “nominal” Nazis. 
Starting in 1947, the transition from aggressive de-Nazification measures to more 
rehabilitative measures began.  
While Ulbricht advocated for an aggressive approach to be taken against Nazis, 
there were others in the SED who had a different approach to the responsibility of most 
of the German people for Nazi brutality and crime. A good example is Johannes Becher 
(1891-1953), who fundamentally disagreed with the idea of collective guilt all along. 
Becher fled to Moscow in 1935 where he was active in cultural affairs. After the end of 
the war he played a big role in the cultural development of the Soviet Zone, and was 
eventually appointed Minister of Culture for the DDR. His approach to de-Nazification 
stressed a cultural and social change in society that was less concerned with physical 
purges and condemnation of individuals than with a society-wide change of attitude. He 
believed that Hitler’s rule and the war had resulted in a “moral mass degeneracy” of the 
people and more than just the exclusion of Nazis from German society was necessary for 
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reform. He spoke of the danger of “superficial anti-fascism” and said that instead 
“conscious anti-imperialism” was needed. Becher argued that the “arousal of national 
hatred for the Nazis and German imperialism is the purifying thunderstorm required for a 
rebirth of Germany.33 In contrast to Ulbricht, who wanted to extirpate Nazis completely 
from German society, Becher advocated the slow assimilation of Nazis back into society 
after they were reeducated. He saw no need for the mass elimination of National 
Socialists from society.  
A new effort to separate “active” from “nominal” Nazis came in a policy 
statement in August 1947 by the Soviet Military Administration, called Order 201. This 
jumpstarted the process of rehabilitation that Johannes Becher envisioned. It allowed the 
former “nominal” Nazis to “participate with the democratic strata of the people in the 
general endeavor to re-create a peaceful, democratic Germany.”34 The Soviet Military 
Administration published Order 201 in the “Tägliche Rundschau,” the official newspaper 
of the Red Army in the Soviet Zone, and used the occasion to notify the people of the 
Eastern Zone how it intended to carry out these measures. The bulletin declared that 
“…great progress was made in the Soviet Zone of Occupation towards the cleansing of 
public offices…[and as a consequence] the basis of fascism, militarism, and reaction has 
been seriously shaken in the Soviet Zone of Occupation.”35 Going beyond this  
triumphant note, the Soviet Military Administration elaborated on what should be done in 
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such a way as to suggest that the zone was entering into a new phase of de-Nazification. 
A few of these measures were as follows: 
The German administrative bodies and Denazification Commissions must take 
necessary measures for the acceleration of the execution and completion of 
denazification in the Soviet Zone of Germany...German juridical authorities must 
concentrate their attention on a speedy indictment of war criminals, of members 
of the criminal Nazi organizations and of leading personalities of the Hitler 
regime, and accelerate examination of their cases…The German administrative 
bodies will be entrusted with the removal, within three months, of all former 
active fascists and militarists from all public and semi-public posts…the German 
authorities must not confiscate or sequestrate property, or forcibly evict former 
fascists from their homes except on instructions from juridical or equivalent 
administrative bodies.36  
 
The language of Order 201 was not harsh and condemning of the German people, but 
rather it suggested that they should start to transition into a new phase of de-Nazification. 
The acceleration of the de-Nazification process suggests one last push was being made to 
root out the Nazis before a more standardized procedure, and one that was slower, 
emerged. The de-Nazification commissions were asked to start finishing their work and 
local German authorities were asked to be a less aggressive force in the confiscation of 
property, both of which suggest a beginning of the end of de-Nazification efforts. Order 
201 was the point of transition from severe purges to a program of integration into an 
anti-fascist, democratic society. 
The announcement of Order 201 as well as the Soviet Military Administration’s 
plans for its implementation show a transition in the Soviet relationship with the German 
people. The Soviet Military Administration delivered the order to the people, but the 
implementation of it lay in the hands of the newly elected German authorities. This 
transition was taking place across Germany, but emphasis in the Soviet Zone on political 
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reliability set the process apart from that taking place in the West. The importance of 
political reliability in the de-Nazification commissions can be seen in the statement that 
“membership of [de-Nazification] commissions will be confined to persons who have in 
fact proved their democratic convictions and are thus able, by virtue of their moral and 
political qualities, to arrive at a just solution of the questions before them.”37  The Soviet 
Military Administration was giving more authority to Germans as to the measures they 
could take in de-Nazification, but it is significant that the statement also emphasized that 
political reliability was a factor in what Germans would be appointed to carry out the de-
Nazification process. While Order 201 introduced the beginning of a more lenient 
approach to the purging of Nazis, it also seemed to start fostering a tighter relationship 
with the SED and other politically reliable Germans.   
 The abandonment of formal de-Nazification efforts in the Soviet Zone came with 
the Soviet Military Administration’s Order No. 35 of February 1948, which called for the 
dissolution of the de-Nazification committees. This did not mean that the goal of 
reconstructing society had been met, but rather that the means to achieving it were 
officially changing.38 Walter Ulbricht confirmed the end to the formal de-Nazification 
process in the Soviet Zone in June 1948 when he introduced he two year plan for East 
Germany, while still implying that there was work to be done. He declared that: 
Capitalism has not yet been reformed but the decisive capitalist forces…were 
deprived of power. The state was not reformed, but a new, higher democratic 
order was established by the state order laid down in the provincial constitutions. 
The supreme power no longer serves to safeguard the exploitation of the people 
by the big capitalists and big landowners, but it is in the hands of the working 
class and the other progressive, democratic forces.39 
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 He acknowledged that full reform had not been realized, but he argued that the beginning 
elements of reform were in place. The capitalists had been deprived of power, which 
helped establish a new democratic order. Ulbricht’s speech implied that the work of the 
Soviet Military Administration and the SED was not finished. Capitalists had been 
deprived of their power and now it was time to begin the process of developing socialism. 
This speech paved the way for the rehabilitative measures instituted by the SED and the 
Soviet Military Administration to fully take hold, because in the view of Ulbricht power 
was in the hands of the working class, it just needed to be harnessed.  
The approach to de-Nazification in the Soviet Zone of Germany left room for 
rehabilitation of Nazi Party members, as can be seen in the handling of the nominal Nazi 
population. By the end of the de-Nazification purges in 1948 many East Germans were 
ready to participate in building the new German society. This was especially true among 
those Nazis who had been spared in the process of de-Nazification. Wolfgang Leonhard 
described the attitude of nominal Nazis towards the party line of the SED. He seemed to 
believe the excitement the Germans had for the SED’s ideology. The willingness among 
nominal Nazis to join the ranks of the SED has been attributed by others to their relief at 
having been exempt from the de-Nazification purges, not necessarily their enthusiasm for 
the party itself.40 People were willing to consider a new way of thinking about the future 
if they were not subjected to endless interrogation. This encouraged the spirit of working 
together to build a new, anti-fascist democracy rather than the spirit of condemnation that 
was perpetuated through the excessive use of purges. Though both aggressive and passive 
methods were used in Eastern Germany in the effort to denazify Germany, the new effort 
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directed at rebuilding the cities and rehabilitating the people was the prevailing spirit by 
1948. 
Short case studies of de-Nazification in certain professions that were purged more 
aggressively than others can give us insight into the overall structure of the program. As 
Frederick Taylor points out, the Soviet Military Administration believed that “the 
educational and legal systems were essential for the future control in the zone.” The 
educational system allowed access to the mind of the youth, while through the judicial 
system the people’s liberties as a whole could be controlled.41 The removal of judges 
from the court system right after World War II caused particular problems because the 
number of cases to be tried was at an all time high. The Allied Control Council issued 
Proclamation No. 3 to highlight the fundamentals of judicial reform. Even immediately 
after the war, German courts were responsible for all cases, both civil and criminal, 
unless it was “a case of such a nature as to compromise the security of the Allied 
Forces….” As to the complex question of judges who had served during the Nazi years, 
Proclamation No. 3 required that “…all former members of the Nazi Party who have 
been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons who have 
directly followed the punitive practices of the Hitler regime must be dismissed…”42 Such 
a severe standard meant that most judges throughout Germany were dismissed and as a 
result the personnel of the judicial systems were greatly changed. This allowed for the 
recreation of a new judicial staff under the guise of anti-fascist, democratic renewal.  
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  While the Western Allies were removing a large portion of suspected Nazis from 
the judiciary, the Soviet Military created a huge gap in trained judges by removing all 
who had been associated with the Nazi party. Frederick Taylor uses the example of the 
British who, for example, ruled in October 1945 that 50 percent of the total number of 
appointees to the Legal Civil Service could remain employed as long as they proved they 
were not more than nominally active in the Nazi Party.43 In contrast also to the West, all 
the dismissals made the Soviet Military Administration gave the judiciaries little to no 
possibility of returning to their post.44 The Soviet Military Administration filled this gap 
by replacing established prosecutors and judges with Volksrichter (people’s judges). 
These were proletarian candidates selected by the SED, who began their legal duties with 
as little as six months training.45 The short legal training given to these men taught them 
the essentials of Criminal Law. This was based on the Soviet belief that justice could be 
utilized as a weapon of the State, which confirmed the Soviet Union’s influence over 
their zone of occupation from the outset. Though the system of people’s judges was by no 
means perfect, Timothy Vogt, in his close study of Brandenburg, says it was the most 
effective way to fill the serious shortage of capable judges in society.46 The Soviets 
believed that if the German people were to move past their history of National Socialism, 
it was necessary for the judiciary to undergo radical changes that could only happen 
through a period of extensive purges. 
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Teachers during the Third Reich were subject to extensive purges because of the 
great opportunity they had to influence the minds of the younger generation. Teachers 
during the Nazi era had done much to indoctrinate youth in the fascist, racist ideology of 
the Nazi Party. Immediately after the war, teachers from the elementary level to the 
university level were subject to draconian de-Nazification measures because many of 
their members had embraced the Nazi ideals during the Third Reich.47 The Soviet 
Military Administration imposed harsh measures, dismissing nearly 75 percent of 
teachers in 1945 and another 5 percent in 1946.48 For comparison, the Western Zones put 
most of the German teaching staff through background checks and screenings, but 
eventually decided to rehire more of them than was done in the Soviet Zone. The Soviet 
Zone conducted few background checks and instead dismissed any teachers with Nazi 
affiliation outright.49 Not only were the teachers removed from their positions, but they 
were also barred from being employed by other schools. Paul Wandel, the Director of 
Education for East Germany, decreed that education was of the utmost importance to the 
German people and therefore former members and supporters of the NSDAP could not be 
employed by any school.50 The preparation of new teachers in the Soviet Zone and the 
logistics of the educational system will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4, but it is 
important to recognize the extent to which the Nazi era educational system was uprooted 
in the Soviet Zone. The physical removal of more than three quarters of the teaching staff 
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demonstrated how seriously the Soviet Military Administration of East Germany took the 
de-Nazification efforts in education. 
Removing such a significant percentage of the East German teaching staff from 
the school system left the Soviet Military Administration with the task of refilling their 
positions. John Rodden, a historian of East German education, says that at the end of the 
war the average age of the teachers in Eastern Germany was 52.5, with 22 percent of the 
teachers being over the age of 60.51 De-Nazification of the teaching staff quickly became 
a problem for the Soviet Military Administration because it had to replace so many 
teachers. As with the judicial system, it was necessary to take the reality of the situation 
in Germany into consideration when trying to reconstruct society. A system was 
introduced for quick, efficient training for the new teaching staff was instituted, but even 
so it could not produce the number of teachers needed in the schools, and so the Soviet 
Military Administration again and again had to make compromises. The de-Nazification 
effort was continually delayed by the sheer number of teachers that had to be replaced 
after the initial purge of the educational system. In 1947 the Soviets were forced to allow 
many former Nazis to remain employed because they were unable to train new teachers at 
a fast enough pace.52 Therefore, by 1947 the Soviet Military Administration started to 
shift its focus away from removing former Nazis to educating those corrupt Nazis in the 
teachings of anti-fascism. 
The de-Nazification of the medical field was a delicate task because of the 
important role the maintenance of public health played in postwar Germany. The removal 
of doctors associated with the Nazi party was not as widespread as in the teaching 
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profession because of the extensive training required to replace them. Patients who relied 
upon these doctors would have suffered as a consequence of their removal, so generally 
doctors were exempt from the de-Nazification process.53 As with the other occupations, 
many physicians were members of the Nazi Party and the same was true of other medical 
personnel. One study estimates that between 65 and 80 percent of the doctors in the 
Soviet Zone at the end of the war were associated with the Nazi Party. Removing a large 
number of doctors from the medical field would have created a severe shortage of 
personnel. To make things worse, those who were not ousted from their positions often 
fled to the West in order to avoid their fate under the Soviet occupation. Facing an 
increasing shortage due to the health and safety issues in Germany, the Soviet Military 
Administration compromised in the de-Nazification of the medical field.54 Most Nazis 
remained in their positions throughout the occupation period to help quell the health 
issues in Germany. 
Timothy Vogt summarizes the Communist critique of fascism as following a line 
of reasoning that said “because Nazism was a product of long-term developments in 
Germany, de-Nazification would have to go beyond simply punishing the truly guilty and 
aim at complete social transformation.”55 Though Walter Ulbricht and Johannes Becher 
viewed the de-Nazification process differently, both men believed in the supremacy of 
the KPD’s ideal and that there had to be a unique road to socialism for the German 
people. It was the responsibility of the KPD and each German state’s administration to 
rid themselves of any former Nazis. The Soviet Military Administration provided 
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structural guidance, but the German people had to admit to their past and rid society of 
Nazis on their own. The physical removal of Nazis from power was the necessary 
beginning to a long-term change, but it was also necessary to rehabilitate the people and 
re-educate them to anti-fascist, democratic ideology, what eventually became socialist 
ideology. If the German people were to effectively rebuild they had to be encouraged to 
participate in society again, not consistently cut them down with harsh removals and 
property confiscations. The transition in the Soviet Zone from the work of purging Nazis 
to that of rehabilitating them was a critical point in the history of East Germany, because 
it shows the development of the Zone toward a socialist Germany allied with the Soviet 
Union.  
	   64 
Chapter 3: 
 
Mass Organizations and their Role in Reeducation 
 
The purging of Nazis from society and the work done to rebuild the education 
system were fundamental to reconstructive work in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The 
cleansing of society could only be done effectively though if Germany had a new 
foundation of political parties and organizations with which the German people could get 
involved. Reconstruction began as a grassroots effort on the part of Germans. The Soviet 
Military Administration was skeptical of such spontaneous initiatives on the part of 
Germans and it did not trust them. The Soviet rulers quickly acted to stabilize the Soviet 
Zone by reestablishing political parties and creating mass organizations that were 
centrally controlled and then stripped of authority. Children were arguably the most 
vulnerable in this new Germany, and therefore particular attention was paid to their 
development in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The memoirs of German children who 
remembered the Nazi years and then the postwar years show the true nature of these 
organizations. Such memoirs provide firsthand accounts of the thoughts and feelings of 
German youths and are invaluable in trying to understand the reconstruction of the Soviet 
Zone of Germany. Ultimately, the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD worked to 
attract Germans of all ages to these mass organizations, which promoted national unity in 
an anti-fascist democracy as a way for Germans to distance themselves from the National 
Socialist ideology. Even as the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD were 
encouraging new mass organizations they were simultaneously centralizing control over 
these organizations to bring them in line with the Communist Party. 
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  Almost as soon as the war ended in May 1945, anti-fascist groups cropped up 
throughout Germany. The groups varied in size, depending on the town the anti-fascist 
group represented, but they all shared the same immediate goal of maintaining order and 
to helping to solve the pressing issues of the moment. They often called themselves anti-
fascist committees. In Neukölln, a borough in Berlin, anti-Nazis established an anti-
fascist group on May 8, 1945, the very day the Germans surrendered to the Allies in the 
West. By May 20 the organization had more than 600 members. It had set up five 
orphanages and cleared two sports stadiums of rubble.1 Eilenburg, a small town near 
Leipzig, was said to have nine members. In the city of Leipzig itself, some thirty-eight 
local committees, with around 4,500 members in total, banded together in a city-wide 
anti-fascist committee.2 These examples of the formation of anti-fascist committees 
demonstrate spontaneous German efforts to reconstruct cities after the devastation of war.   
Similarly, workplace councils spontaneously reemerged after the fall of the Nazis 
and swiftly grew in popularity. Gareth Pritchard attributes their revival to a couple of 
factors. First and foremost, these councils had been popular in the 1920s and early 1930s 
until the Nazi Party suppressed their activity. After the war ended, anti-Nazi Germans 
revived these councils to help reorganize economic activity. It is understandable that 
reconstruction of the economy was of the utmost importance to working class people 
after the war. The second reason why Pritchard suggests workplace councils resumed 
work quickly was because during the last harsh months of the war workplaces had 
suffered greatly from bombing and other military destruction, losing buildings and 
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employees in great numbers. Workers saw little alternative but to immediately attempt to 
bring workplaces back into operation on their own initiative. It was necessary for their 
own survival.3  
But there were some problems. Sometimes former Nazis tried to involve 
themselves in anti-fascist worker organizations, hoping that they would be able to evade 
the revenge seeking Red Army soldiers and German Communists looking to rid society 
of Nazis.4 However, committed antifascists and Communists who genuinely wanted 
reform quickly turned the former Nazis out into the streets in most cases, and generally 
the workplace councils strove for sincere economic change.5 Nonetheless, in the first 
crazy days and weeks after the war’s end life in the Soviet Occupation Zone, and in the 
Western Zones, was disorganized. The Soviet Military Administration, which was just 
setting itself up shortly after the war, allowed these grassroots initiatives to thrive, thus 
there were various processes of reconstruction going on in the initial weeks right after the 
end of the war. Multiple agencies and social groups were active at once and each had its 
own agenda. This led to some conflicting opinions about how the reconstruction of 
Germany should actually take place. 
The variety of organizations and the different goals of groups in the Soviet Zone 
was highlighted by different approaches taken by the Soviet Military Administration and 
the KPD to the workplace councils and the anti-fascist groups. The workplace councils 
were seen as potentially beneficial by both the Soviet Military Administration and the 
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newly returned German Communist leaders centered around Walter Ulbricht.6 Walter 
Ulbricht believed that these workplace councils had a central role to play in the process 
of reconstruction.7 The Soviet Military Administration also saw value in the workplace 
councils, but wanted to begin bringing them under Soviet influence early. Starting in 
August 1945, members of the KPD took roles in the work councils. Pressure was slowly 
put on these organizations to fall under the control of the larger Freier Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation, FDGB).8 In Order No. 2 of 
the Soviet Military Administration, discussed in Chapter 1, trade unions and other trade 
organizations were encouraged to revive. In allowing for the creation of such unions, the 
Soviet Military Administration now could have more control over the spontaneous 
activity taking over the Eastern Zone.  
However, the situation with the anti-fascist grassroots groups was more 
complicated. Initially the Soviet Military Administration allowed the anti-fascist groups 
to function in the Soviet Zone, but some German communists were extremely suspicious 
of the groups and in some towns forcibly shut them down.9 The KPD’s Ulbricht gave 
voice to these suspicious, claiming that some of the spontaneous anti-fascist 
organizations actually had been founded by Nazis who had gone underground and were 
seeking to disrupt the progress that the Soviet Military Administration and the German 
Communists were making toward the development of socialism.10 Thus, at first the KPD 
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leaders and the Soviet Military Administration were at odds. Historian Gareth Pritchard 
suggests that this resulted from miscommunication between the Soviet Military 
Administration and the German Communists. Soon the Soviet Military Administration 
also came to distrust these apparently independent initiatives and it started to impose 
restrictions on local anti-fascist groups and to put some pressure on them. By June 1945 
the local anti-fascist groups began to dissolve and encourage their members to join one or 
another political party.11 Then in July 1945 the Soviet Military Administration declared 
that independent anti-fascist groups would only be allowed to function if they made a 
formal request to do so and if part of their practice was to promote friendship with the 
Soviet Union. In practice, these rules pushed out independently run anti-fascist 
organizations fairly quickly, but the Soviet Military Administration seemed to see a value 
in the appearance of democracy in East Germany.  
More liberal Communists such as Wolfgang Leonhard were skeptical of this 
restrictive policy. He believed it was contradictory to dissolve these anti-fascist 
organizations spontaneously created by Germans and then ask those same Germans to 
fight for the same democratic Germany under a Party-run organization. Leonhard says 
the policy was an effort by the Soviet Military Administration to draw the German people 
away from their Nazi past by immersing them in new organizations founded on Marxist-
Leninist principles, but that it was done by restricting the people’s freedoms to create a 
new Germany in their own image. However, despite his hesitations, in the end Leonhard 
went along. He said his Soviet training and also his faith that its policies were correct 
were too strong and prevented him from following his conscience and disobeying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11Pritchard, The Making of the GDR 1945-53, 36-37.	  	  	  	  
	   69 
orders to dissolve the anti-fascist organizations.12 By closing down the spontaneous 
German-created anti-fascist organizations, the Soviet Military Administration and the 
KPD pushed people who wanted to oppose Nazism toward limited Communist-
dominated, Soviet approved organizations. In effect, these forces acted to centralize anti-
fascism and insist that they control what anti-fascist meant and how it was organized.  
The announcement of Order No. 2 by the Soviet Military Administration in June 
1945 allowed for political parties and other organizations that promoted democratic 
values to form. This order initiated the revival of political parties such as the KPD and 
the SPD and encouraged them to become more publicly active in the reconstruction of 
Germany.13 These organizations were to work against any remnants of fascism and 
simultaneously help create a foundation for democracy in the Soviet Zone. The Order 
stated that  
The working population of the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany is to have 
the right to unite in free trade unions and organizations to protect the interests and 
rights of all working people. Trade union organizations and societies are to have 
the right to conclude collective agreements with employers and to form friendly 
societies and other institutions for mutual aid, as well as cultural, educational, and 
other institutes and organizations of enlightenment.14 
 
 Allowing the formation of trade unions and institutions helped promote the image of 
democracy in the Soviet Zone. This could be seen as an effort to prematurely create a 
German administration, but again the Soviet Military Administration was adamant that 
these organizations were solely for the purposes of aiding in the foundation of 
democracy. They were not self-administrations because activities of these organizations 
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were under the control of the Soviet Military Administration as long as the occupation 
period lasted.15  
Trade unions were often closely associated with political parties in Weimar 
Germany, so it was not surprising that the Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free 
German Trade Union, FDGB) was founded in June 1945 alongside the new and revived 
political parties in the Soviet Zone. It replaced the single Nazi labor organization that had 
existed for twelve years, but the new FDGB was linked to the KPD. Its mission was to 
raise working class consciousness and workers’ morale and to help undo the damage 
caused by the twelve-year Nazi war against labor. The FDGB called for improved 
conditions for workers and began to implement a system of social insurance. It concerned 
itself with matters such as holidays, labor, hygiene, and protection of the worker.16 The 
FDGB oversaw appointments and dismissals in factories, monitored prices, set wages, 
guarded against sabotage, and at times assisted in de-Nazification of the workplace.17 
Membership in the FDGB was strong from the beginning and grew over time. It had a 
membership of roughly 2.2 million in 1946, which increased to 4.7 million by 1950.18 
The steady rise in membership suggests that the working class depended on the FDGB, 
which only became stronger as East Germany developed.  
Another mass youth organization, the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German 
Youth) emerged in March 1946. In its history we can see another example of a mass 
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organization that soon came to have close ties with the KPD and fit into the pattern of 
increasing centralization of social organizations. Youth organizations had a long history 
in German culture and this was why the creation of a single youth organization became 
so critical for the KPD. The Wandervögel, which began at the turn of the 20th century, 
was a non-political movement. It provided youths with a means of opposing a society that 
they believed had nothing to offer them. It gave youth a sense of independence and an 
opportunity to lead their lives independently from parents, homes, and teachers.19 After 
World War I, the Wandervögel movement adapted to the changing climate in Germany. 
Youth organizations focused more on discipline, and their structure became more 
hierarchical.20 For many youths the Wandervögel and other youth groups led naturally to 
enthusiastic participation in Nazi Party organizations during the tumultuous period 
between the end of World War I and the rise to power of the Nazi Party in 1933.  
The Nazi Youth organization Hitler Youth (Hitler Jugend) was founded in 1922 
and was a defining experience for many young men during the years of the Third Reich. 
A parallel organization for girls was the League of German Girls (Bund Deutscher 
Mädel, BDM) created in mid 1920s. The lives of youths were full of uncertainty, and 
Michael Kater argues that many found the authoritarian nature of the Nazi regime and the 
Hitler youth organizations a point of attraction for them. It was an exciting opportunity 
for youth to be respected and have a sense of responsibility.21 Almost all German youths 
were active in the Hitler Youth or the League of German Girls during the Nazi years. It is 
estimated that almost 8.7 million of the 8.87 million 10-18 year olds in the Third Reich 
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belonged to either the Hitler Youth or the League of German Girls.22 The younger 
generation was clearly so dedicated to their role in the Third Reich that, not surprisingly, 
the fall of the Reich led to apathy and a widespread disinterest in politics throughout 
Germany. Richard Bessel argues that apathy was widespread among the youth because 
the war had taken such a toll on them.23 The children of the war era were the most 
affected because they had been told by the Nazi Party that they would build the thousand 
year Reich. They had lived under the illusion that they were the superior race and with 
the end of the war they saw that this was false. With their illusions shattered and their 
homeland reduced to rubble, young Germans in both the Soviet Zone and the Western 
Zones tended to renounce all political activity. Many felt used and abandoned.  
 The FDJ was officially revived in March 1946 to give youths after the war an 
outlet to take part in society again while distancing themselves from the Nazi past.24 The 
FDJ originated in 1936 as an amalgamation of the Communist Youth movement with two 
socialist youth groups. Its anti-Nazi underground status invited action by the Gestapo and 
soon it was forced into exile. It became the primary youth organization in the Soviet Zone 
of Germany. While its structure was similar to the Hitler Youth, its aims for its activity 
were divergent. In the announcement of the formation of the FDJ in March 1946, the 
Soviet Military Administration announced that the “…youth are given the possibility of 
free, democratic activity…in an appropriate organization” and that “the new organization 
allows no military or fascist activity to be exhibited whatsoever. It must serve the values 
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of people’s friendship and freedom…”25 In the announcement of the aims of the FDJ, the 
organization distinctly set itself apart from the Hitler Youth. Its commitment to friendship 
and its insistence that it would not affiliate with militaristic acts seemed to be a direct 
comparison to the activity of the Hitler Youth. It emphasized freedom and a sense of 
unity in a fight against fascism, which gave promise to the future of an anti-fascist, 
democratic Germany.  
The revival of the FDJ coincided with the unification of the KPD and the SPD 
into the SED and was part of the KPD’s effort to solidify its leadership over Germans in 
the Soviet Zone. In reviving the FDJ, the SED sought to unify all youth organizations in 
“a single, nonpartisan youth group.”26 Erich Honecker, then the leader of the FDJ, later 
wrote that he firmly believed in the mission of the Communist Party to “establish an 
antifascist regime...with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people,” and that he 
wanted to see these freedoms extended to the younger generation.27 About the 
reestablishment of the FDJ, Honecker said it was, “an organization had been created in 
the ranks of which young people of different ideological perspectives, social background 
and occupation were united and which committed itself to social progress.”28 The FDJ 
included both boys and girls in its ranks. This organization brought the younger 
generation together and subtly taught the postwar youth of Germany the values of the 
Communist Party through the activities organized by FDJ leaders. The youths learned 
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about working in a collective and about Marxist-Leninist ideology. From the outset the 
FDJ ensured that it kept its distance from politics.  
 We can see two phases in the early years of the FDJ – a “democratic phase,” from 
1946 to early 1947, and a more regimented “socialist phase” from 1947 on. The early 
functions of the FDJ, in its “democratic phase,” were to organize leisure time activities 
for young people, such as hiking, sporting events, concerts and movies. It was a unisex 
organization which appealed to those youths who had not liked being separated from 
their counterparts through the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls.29 
Educational training and career opportunities were afforded to members of the FDJ, 
especially youths with working class backgrounds. It was an opportunity for youths to 
escape from the bleak life of Germany around them and to envision a better future for 
Germany. Such educational and social motives encouraged young people to begin to 
accept the Communist anti-fascist political program of the FDJ.30 Establishing a level of 
comfort for the younger generation from the beginning seemed to draw in youth and to 
encourage them to believe that Communist Party ideology offered the right path for 
Germany. That young people took to this organization seemed to demonstrate that the 
initiatives of the Communists and Soviet Military Administration were working to use a 
mass organization to win over a portion of the population.  
 Alan McDougall argues that the FDJ appealed to youths because they could relate 
to it. It promised to maintain a lot of the structure they were so familiar with in the Hitler 
Youth but without the intensity of the Nazi organizations. Discipline and physical activity 
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were stressed in both organizations. “Militant language” used by the Nazis was simply 
transformed into a new war against fascism and channeled into the efforts of 
reconstruction after 1945. In the League of German Girls, Melita Maschmann was ready 
to serve Germany and make the German people great. In her memoir Account Rendered, 
she discusses her time in the League of German Girls and why she felt so devoted to its 
activity. She admits that she “believed [the National Socialists] when they said they 
would reunite the German nation…and overcome the consequences of the dictated peace 
of Versailles.”31 She remained committed to the League of German Girls and in 1933 was 
given the responsibility of supplying her local daily newspaper with information and 
reports about League activity. The authority she was given in the position was appealing 
to her and seems to be something she strove for throughout her time with the League of 
German Girls.32 It was this level of commitment and desire to help reconstruct Germany 
that the leaders of the FDJ wanted to emulate in their own organization. 
 Youth of the FDJ were similarly conscious of their duty and ready to help serve 
the Fatherland. The means were the same, but toward different ends. The FDJ’s promise 
of a democratic society was motivating enough for young people to devote themselves to 
this new youth organization. Simple aspects of the FDJ, such as the dedication to 
friendship and comradeship, drew in youths.33 Debates about how to balance the negative 
influence of the Hitler Youth on all youths and how to utilize their leadership skills 
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without the Hitler Youth’s militaristic aspect took place throughout the late 1940s.34 The 
SED emphasized the positive components of comradeship and dedication in order to 
encourage former Hitler Youth members to get involved, but once youths entered the FDJ 
it became more restrictive and increasingly similar to the Hitler Youth.  
The FDJ grew stricter in the beginning of 1947. One of the causes was a conflict 
about the Christian youth in the FDJ. A good way to understand this conflict is to look at 
the story of Manfred Klein, a Christian member of the FDJ, who grappled with his dual 
responsibility to his religion and to his membership in the FDJ. He had spent time in a 
Soviet prison camp during the war and while there he was encouraged to join the 
Communist party. Once he returned to Germany after the war, he was still deeply tied to 
the church and so joined the Christian Democratic Union in June 1945.35 He spoke with 
KPD members, namely Erich Honecker, about involvement in youth organizations. 
Honecker seemed enthusiastic to have a Christian representative in the FDJ and promised 
Klein that “…for his cooperation, the Catholic youths would be trusted by the youth 
committees…”36 Klein’s interest in the FDJ and his membership in the CDU was not an 
issue for Honecker, as the FDJ was inclusive of girls and boys from different parts of 
society. But Klein’s dual loyalty became problematic once the FDJ’s ties to socialism 
grew stronger. In March 1947 Manfred Klein, along with 15 other Christian leaders in the 
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East, was arrested by the East German secret police. Klein was sentenced to work in a 
Soviet labor camp and remained there for nine years.37  
The leaders of the SED wanted to expand the range of its youth organization by 
providing an opportunity for small children to get involved. The Young Pioneers (Junge 
Pioniere) were established in December 1948 as a “Children’s Association of the FDJ.”38 
The Young Pioneers worked to ensure German children were raised to be studious, 
forward thinking, work-happy, industrious, democratic youths. The Pioneer organization 
prepared children for the next level of work and training that characterized membership 
in the FDJ. This preparation was echoed in the motto of the Young Pioneers, “Keines zu 
klein – Kämpfer zu sein” (No one too small to be a fighter). The motto reflected the more 
militant attitude that East German leaders took as they came closer to founding the 
German Democratic Republic. At the same time, the Young Pioneers were committed to 
instilling the ideals of friendship and community in children. The Young Pioneers 
expressed its allegiance to its parent organization, the FDJ, by asking the children to wear 
blue neckerchiefs symbolizing the blue of the FDJ flag. The neckerchief had three 
corners to represent “school-parents-Pioneer Organization” so that the children 
understood their priorities.39 The creation of the Pioneer Organization was yet another 
step toward subordination of the German youth population under one ideology.  
 The reestablishment of the FDJ in 1946 and the subsequent creation of the Young 
Pioneers in 1948 reflect critical stages in the development of East German mass 
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organizations. The FDJ was initially a non-political, leisure organization, but by the time 
the Young Pioneers were created it had become a structured organization aimed at 
centralizing the activity of the younger generation. The SED’s intention was to separate 
youth from their Nazi past, but the similarities between the Hitler Youth and the FDJ are 
striking. The goal may have been to break youth from Nazi ideology, but ultimately the 
SED was utilizing the same means as the Nazis toward different ideological ends. The 
stories of FDJ members, such as Manfred Klein, and their eventual exclusion from the 
FDJ because of their religion and political party affiliation, demonstrate the increasing 
restrictions that were placed on youths in East Germany. The more years that passed after 
the end of World War II and the farther away the Soviet Union grew from the Western 
Allies, the closer the SED grew to the Soviet Union, and it became comfortable 
centralizing control over the people. This was an important trend in the history of the 
Soviet Zone of Occupation because it was one seen in many different spheres throughout 
society and in all countries in the Eastern Bloc. By the end of the 1940s, control over 
politics and mass organizations by the SED became even stronger. The close relationship 
between the Soviet Union and East Germany was visible, representing the ruptured 
relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. 
Historian Mary Fulbrook argues that mass organizations such as the Free German 
Trade Union, the Free German Youth, and the Young Pioneers were of strategic 
importance to the East German Communists because they were means for the SED to 
implement its social and economic policies. They could ensure worker and student 
discipline and exercise increasingly more control over the people. It became increasingly 
difficult for Germans to find jobs if they were not members of the FDGB. That by 1949 
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employment was in large measure dependent on being connected to the FDGB by 1949 
demonstrates the SED’s tight control over East Germany. By then, affiliation with the 
FDJ also helped students as they applied to University, again demonstrating the way the 
mass organizations helped to control the path to advancement. As Fulbrook so eloquently 
states, the FDGB “represented not the interests of the workers to the employer, but rather 
the interests of the party and the state to the workers.”40 Based on the number of people 
who eventually became members of the FDGB and the FDJ, it is clear that they were not 
deterred by those organizations’ affiliation with the anti-fascist bloc and later the SED. If 
Germans wanted to move forward in society, often times there was no choice but to join 
one of these organizations. 
The Soviet Military Administration maintained deep control over the mass 
organizations in East Germany and helped to drive the transition to a more centralized 
system. The shift away from a wide variety of independent mass organizations and 
parties to the more centralized system began in early 1946 and moved forward 
throughout the year. The leaders of trade unions, the governors of the provinces, and the 
chairs of the Central Administrations in the Soviet Zone began to meet to work through 
the problems Germany faced. The first meetings were called by the Soviet authorities in 
the spring of 1947 and continued until the formation of an official governmental body in 
1948.41 The Soviet Military Administration created a German Economic Commission for 
its zone in February 1948. It intended to “enable the German democratic bodies to 
participate more actively in reconstruction and in the development of a peace 
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economy.”42 The Economic Commission had one chairman and two deputy chairmen 
overseeing its functioning. Each mass organization in the Soviet Zone had at least one 
representative, while bigger organizations such as the FDGB had three representatives. 
This Commission was under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Military Administration, but it 
had a permanent executive body comprised of German citizens that was in charge of 
issuing the decrees and instructions of the Soviet Military Administration.43 The German 
Economic Commission centralized all mass organizations and political work in the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation and brought East Germany closer in line with the systems in place at 
the time in other countries in the Eastern bloc. 
The power of the German Economic Commission only grew stronger as tensions 
between the East and the West rose. As reconstruction and development in the zone 
advanced, it was necessary for the Soviet Military Administration to “improve contacts 
between the German zonal administrative bodies and the population.”44 Later in 1948, the 
number of members in the German Economic Commission was expanded from 36 
members to 101. There were more representatives from each of the Länder in the Soviet 
Zone, who were elected into the position, and more representatives appointed by each 
political party and mass organization.45 The SED was heavily represented on the 
Economic Commission because the other organizations that were part of the Commission 
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had many SED members in them. Not only was the Economic Commission centralizing 
the power of the political parties and the mass organizations, but it was asserting the 
dominance of the SED over the rest of East Germany.46  
 In the fall of 1949, as the German Democratic Republic was about to be 
established, strong relations between the Soviet Union and East Germany became even 
clearer through the creation of Friendship societies. The German-Soviet Friendship 
Society (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft: GDSF) was initiated by 
Sergei Tiul’panov, the Director of the Propaganda Administration for the Soviet Military 
Administration in order to deepen the political relationship between Germany and the 
Soviet Union.47 “Friendship” was a stock phrase for the SED throughout East Germany, 
as is seen in the FDJ and the Young Pioneers. To the SED the “Great Socialist Soviet 
Union was the model for and sole guarantor of the SED’s notion of the Socialist 
Fatherland.”48 Friendship was to be extended to the Soviet Union and not just emphasized 
within East Germany. The GDSF saw its task as “spreading the truth about the Soviet 
Union, fighting every kind of slander and opposition…and through this… [securing] and 
[deepening] the friendship of the German people with the people of the Soviet Union.”49 
The GDSF quickly grew into a mass organization because the SED and other German 
organizations gave priority to the GDSF in their daily activities.50 The Soviet Military 
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Administration, following directives from Moscow, dictated what the GDSF did and how 
it supported the Soviet Union’s goals. 
 The German-Soviet Friendship Society seemed to be a different mass 
organization from some others studied in this chapter because it was not founded on 
economic values or strictly as a leisure organization strictly for children. It appears to 
have been founded to solidify a relationship between East Germany and the Soviet 
Union. The name itself directly linked the two countries, bonding them together as the 
Soviet Zone struggled to develop and find its own footing in the postwar world. This is 
also a unique organization because, unlike the FDJ, it was upfront in its connection with 
the Soviet Union. By 1949 there was no denying the relationship between East Germany 
and the Soviet Union, thereby making it political. Though indoctrination in Marxist-
Leninist ideology may have been subtle in the first years of occupation, by the 1949 there 
was no discretion about the path of the Soviet zone toward socialism and a relationship 
with the Soviet Union.  
 By the time the German Democratic Republic was founded in October 1949, 
virtually no part of society could escape the influence of the SED. The whole of society 
was deeply penetrated by the rigid and centrally-controlled structure of the Party 
institutions and organizations, from work councils to the activities of the FDJ to the 
German-Soviet Friendship Society.51 In the early postwar years there were possibilities 
for the development of a genuine democracy because of the existence of a variety of 
political and social groups. The ability to explore new ideologies and activities pleased 
the German people, who had led such oppressed lives under the Third Reich. With 
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nonpartisan organizations calling for the people’s participation, the German people began 
to distance themselves from their Nazi past and envision a new future. But then, with the 
formation of the SED and its increasing domination over these mass organizations, the 
hope for democracy diminished. Though the FDJ originated as a non-partisan leisure 
organization, it soon came under the National Front. Political parties would face this 
same fate. The National Front that officially formed in 1950 in effect took the place of 
the anti-fascist bloc in that was an alliance of political parties and mass organizations. It 
was under the influence of the SED and therefore was directly politically affiliated. The 
SED encouraged citizen participation in the activities of the new East Germany, but it 
was really mobilization of the masses to serve the purpose of the government. It was 
through the SED’s efforts to mobilize and control the masses that Soviet-style socialism 
came to prevail in East Germany.
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Chapter 4: 
 
 Reeducation of German Youth: The New Educational System 
 
 There were many gaps in the German educational system that needed to be 
addressed after World War II to ensure the proper functioning of schools. Most schools 
throughout the country were either completely destroyed or extremely damaged from 
bombings. The lack of physical buildings made it difficult to start school again soon after 
the war. Education was important because it was a direct link to influencing the younger 
generation. Students had been influenced by their Nazi era teachers and this work needed 
to be undone. The Allied powers agreed that the educational system needed to be 
reconstructed so as to rid German society of Nazi ideology. An all-Allied policy set out at 
Potsdam expressly stated that the educational system was to be “so controlled as 
completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful 
development of democratic ideas.”1 Proceeding forward with this foundation for the 
establishment of a new educational system in Germany, the Allied powers began to 
reconstruct education. Studying early developments in the Soviet Zone of Germany helps 
to understand how socialist ideology was integrated into society.  
The Soviet Military Administration and the KPD dealt with issues in education in 
a number of ways. They removed an overwhelming number of teachers without question. 
This created large shortages of teachers and forced the Soviet Military Administration to 
create a system to replace them. Curricula were changed to focus more on the problems 
of capitalism and how it destroyed Germany rather than a genuine interpretation of 
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history. More working class German were admitted to University and given the 
opportunity to receive higher education. All of these changes were introduced gradually 
and caused the Western Allies concern. They did not agree with the Soviet Union’s 
interpretation of history and this created a rift between East and West that added to the 
heightening tensions of the Cold War. By the end of the 1940s political affiliation was 
central to University admission and employment, thereby solidifying the educational 
system’s role in the making of socialism.  
Most, if not all, school buildings in certain parts of Germany were either severely 
damaged or destroyed in bombings carried out by the Allied powers. This posed a serious 
obstacle for the Allied powers as they tried to reconstruct. The Soviet Military 
Administration enlisted children and teachers to physically remove rubble and clear the 
schools. This physical removal of Nazi ideology also included tangible pieces of Nazism, 
namely fascist or militaristic images and texts. Teachers were to ensure that Nazi-era 
textbooks or lesson plans were not used and this was a huge job. For instance, when the 
Soviets entered the town of Mecklenburg in May 1945, the University was still running 
with a full library of Nazi era texts. No time was wasted in closing down the University 
and its library until more appropriate educational material was brought in.2 This example 
shows that the Soviets took the task of eradicating Nazi ideology from the educational 
system very seriously. The new school system that the Soviet Military Administration 
and the KPD began to reconstruct took into consideration the long tradition of German 
education beginning in the 19th century. 
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German educational tradition was rooted in the high culture of the 19th century. 
The Gymnasium arose from an interest in educating an elite group of students, mainly 
those of the upper class, on a classical curriculum of Latin and Greek. Students who were 
able to attend Gymnasium were guaranteed a path to university. The classical curriculum 
was significant because it led students to many important professions and ensured them a 
spot in the upper echelon of society. The Realschulen were schools that trained students 
for clerical or technical positions. Students were taught Latin, but the focus remained on 
non-classical subjects such as mathematics and the natural sciences. Those who finished 
Realschule took a graduation examination and received certification, though this did not 
entitle them to enroll in University. The Oberrealschulen taught no ancient languages. 
Instead students were taught English, French, math, science, German, history, geography 
and drawing. Besides the differences in curriculum at each of these schools, class 
remained the largest barrier in the educational system in 19th century Germany.3  
Come the end of World War I in 1918, the Weimar Republic was born and 
changed the nature of education for the German people. It sought to make a more 
democratic system open to all students regardless of class. The educational system in the 
Weimar Republic was reconstructed in order to combat the caste system of the 19th 
century German Empire. During Weimar, political parties of the left, such as the Social 
Democrats, sought to remove social barriers, create more equal career opportunities for 
all Germans, and to make Germany’s educational system genuinely democratic.4 
Reformist scholars wanted to encourage independent thinking through education and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 24-31.	  	  
4Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 71. 	  	  
	   87 
move away from the more rigid methods used in the old Gymnasium. Students receiving 
such a distinguished education were often of a higher economic status, which is what led 
to many of the objections of the political left.5 Institutions such as the Realgymnasium, 
the Oberrealschule, and the Deutsche Oberrealschule were created to provide greater 
diversity in the educational opportunities afforded to students. With the rise to power of 
the Nazi Party in 1933, the educational system of the Weimar Republic was replaced with 
the racist, fascist ideology of the Nazi Party. The new educational system promoted by 
the Soviet Military Administration and their allies worked to eradicate such harmful 
thinking and promote a more inclusive environment, but at the expense of other values in 
the German tradition.  
It was the recent, overwhelming Nazi experience that the Allied powers had to 
root out. National Socialist rule had exerted massive control and centralized power over 
the schools and their ideological content. The schools trained Germans to love and fight 
for the Fatherland. State intervention was heavy in the schools, and Gilmer Blackburn, 
historian of Nazi education, suggests this was so because the Nazis did not want to leave 
the children alone. This could lead them to dissenting thoughts about the Nazi Party.6 In 
the Nazi book So Ward Das Reich it is stated that  
The education of National Socialists starts in childhood. The mother is in the 
National Socialist Women’s Group, the Father in the SA….in the community 
school [the child] comes to know the Führer…Then he is ready for the Hitler 
Youth…there he sees the Führer and hears the words: ‘For you, my young ones, 
you are the living Germany of the future, not an empty idea, no mere scheme. 
You are blood of our blood, flesh of our flesh, spirit of our spirit, you are our 
people continuing to live…’7 
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So Ward Das Reich emphasized for the German people the importance of their 
commitment to the Nazi Party and specifically what role they could play in the future of 
Germany. The educational system was central to indoctrinating youths to the idea that 
they were the foundation of German society. There was no sense of the individual, but 
rather they all focused on the whole. Everything was for the Fatherland.8 This intense 
nationalism swept the German nation and infiltrated many parts of society. As exhibited 
by So Ward Das Reich, the educational system was one such area.  
 Teachers were indoctrinated in Nazi ideology through the Nationalsozialistische 
Lehrerbund (National Socialist Teachers’ League). This organization was founded in 
1927 and encouraged teachers to emphasize all the wonders of the German race and to 
advocate for the new life that the Nazi Party was creating.9 The Nazi Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service in April 1933 gave the Nazis legal authority 
to purge German civil servants hostile to the Nazi Party’s aims and to appoint their own 
cadre of administrators. Article 2 of this law directly targeted members of the KPD or 
related organizations. It intended to purge those employed after November 9, 1918, the 
day on which German revolutionaries declared a Republic, who lacked proper training or 
other qualifications necessary to participate in the civil service.10 This was intended to 
create a politicized civil service, dedicated to the ideological aims of the Nazi Party. In 
creating a politicized corps of teachers under the Nazi Party, the educational system was 
consequently politicized as well. This process had to be undone by the Allied powers 
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through the de-Nazification efforts of 1945-1948. Instead of an indoctrination in Nazism, 
a new democratic ideology was promoted by the Allies. 
In order to incorporate democratic ideals into the school system it was necessary 
to remove the teachers who had been members of or sympathized with the Nazi Party. 
Considering that the Soviet Union believed the educational system to be one of the most 
direct routes to the hearts and minds of the German youths, it is not surprising that the 
Soviet Military Administration took aggressive measures to root out the Nazi leadership 
in schools. The Soviet Military Administration removed 72 percent of Soviet Zone 
teachers in 1945 and another five percent in 1946. While the West was handing out 
questionnaires, the Soviet Military Administration physically removed teachers without 
question.11 If the teachers were not being forcibly removed they fled West in order to 
avoid Soviet rule. Six major Universities in the Soviet Zone lost 75 percent of their 
professors.12 These numbers were overwhelming and created major problems for the 
Soviet Military Administration as it tried to decide how to reconstruct. Plans were 
implemented soon after the war to get some schooling started while these large scale 
problems were addressed.  
The Soviet Military Administration wanted schools in its zone to reopen in June 
1945. This was an unrealistic expectation considering the damages sustained by school 
buildings during the war and the depleted corps of teachers that resulted from de-
Nazification purges. Despite the inability to conduct formal school the Soviet Military 
Administration managed to create an interim program with a unique curriculum catering 
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to postwar students. Instead of traditional courses that followed a structured state-
sanctioned curriculum according to academic discipline, such as biology or German 
literature, students learned about current issues and problems facing Germany. This 
allowed students to begin to see the problems - physical, economic, moral, political - that 
Hitler and the Nazi Party brought upon Germany. The aim was to give children the sense 
that their country needed to move away from its dark past. Much of the school work was 
done outdoors, largely because of the lack of physical classrooms in which to conduct 
lessons. Songs, sports and group activity were of particular interest for the Soviet Zone 
because it continued a long German tradition and was something the occupiers had 
experience with in their own Soviet tradition. Using pieces of German tradition to restart 
the educational system was a powerful tool because it seemed to many Germans to be a 
way to preserve much of German culture while implementing a new curriculum for 
students. While Nazi-era supplies were being replaced, teachers were encouraged to bring 
songs, drawings, sports, outside activity, and games into the classrooms so that there 
would still be a degree of normalcy in the lives of the students.13  
Along with efforts to disassociate the Germans in the Soviet Zone from the old 
Germany under the Nazi Party, the Soviet Military Administration mandated Russian 
language instruction for all students. Historian Charles Lansing suggests that such early 
insistence on Russian language instruction could stem from a deep Russian belief in the 
supremacy of its own culture or from a desire to connect with German students early. The 
Soviet Military Administration prohibited other foreign languages from being taught in 
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the Summer of 1945 and the focus was solely placed on Russian.14 The study of Russian 
language quickly became an important aspect of the curricular development of the Soviet 
Zone. Whatever may be the case for the early introduction of Russian language 
instruction into the Soviet Zone, the development of such cultural influence over students 
early on in the occupation seems to foreshadow the lasting presence of the Soviet Union 
in the lives of the German people in the eastern sector.  
The Soviet Military Administration saw the effects of its sweeping de-
Nazification policies early on in the shortage of teachers throughout all of the Soviet 
Zone Länder. There was a desperate need for roughly 40,000 teachers. These shortages 
forced the Soviet Military Administration to institute three to four week crash courses 
which taught Neulehrer (new teachers) about basic pedagogy.15 Quickly the Soviet 
Military Administration realized these Neulehrer needed more, and better, training. The 
Neulehrer program was extended to three months and focused on the teaching of music 
and singing, the study of Russian, and the contemporary political issues that were being 
so heavily encouraged in the initial months after the war. This training was brief, as it 
was merely intended in the beginning to increase the number of teachers in the corps.16 In 
August 1945 Paul Wandel (1905-1995) gave shape to the standards for the teaching 
profession when he declared  
Only those teachers can be employed who can guarantee that they will educate the 
youth according to the true democratic principles, free of Nazi and militaristic 
beliefs (Gedankengänge)…The goal is…to empower teachers to become, in this 
decisive epoch of our history, convinced pioneers (bewusste Vorkämpfer) for a 
political, spiritual, and moral democratic rejuvenation of our national life.17 
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Wandel had been a committed Communist Party member since 1926 and, like many other 
Communist Party members, he had fled to the Soviet Union in 1933. He was a central 
KPD member in the development of the educational system in postwar East Germany. In 
regard to the Neulehrer program, Wandel believed that Neulehrer should be young, 
preferably female and prove themselves committed to democracy. Pedagogical abilities 
and the educational qualifications of the Neulehrer were of the utmost importance in 
establishing a corps of teachers.18 These basic specifications helped start the program that 
created Neulehrer for the new educational system in the Soviet Zone.  
The Soviet Military Administration’s Deutsche Verwaltung für Volksbildung 
[DVV] was founded in July 1945 and began to bring uniformity to the educational 
policies in the Soviet Zone.19 The first Director of Education for the DVV was Paul 
Wandel. He helped centralize the educational system in the course of the next five years. 
Fears of Communist influence over German life extended to the educational system and 
the centralized nature of the DVV. The Allies had agreed that “the administration of 
affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political 
structure and the development of local responsibility.”20 The Soviets countered that the 
DVV was not a form of German self-administration because it answered to the Soviet 
Military Administration. Anton Ackermann (1905-1973) defended the DVV and its aims 
for Germany. As a committed member of the KPD since 1926, he studied at the Lenin 
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School in Moscow and also remained in exile in Moscow during the Nazi years. He was 
the editor of the German language newspaper in Moscow “The Free Word,” which is 
where his interest in the DVV may have stemmed from. Ackermann saw the creation of 
the DVV as “good for the development of the Eastern part of Germany and it had long-
term significance for the whole of Germany.”21 He acknowledged that the West was 
worried about the domination of the Red Army in Germany, but emphasized that the 
DVV was looking to balance the centralization with self-administration. There would be 
enough room for the state and provincial administration to develop in their own way.22 
Despite initial concerns from the West, the DVV continued as an agency for development 
of the educational sphere in the Soviet Zone.  
 The Soviet Military Administration issued Order No. 40 on August 25, 1945 to 
announce the reopening of schools on October 1, 1945. It demanded that the new schools 
offer “instruction and education free of Nazi, militaristic, racist and other reactionary 
theories.”23 It forbade the use of books that had been printed during the Nazi years or 
promoted propaganda of Nazi, racist, or militaristic theory. Instead, books that were 
printed before 1933 were to be used and a list of such books had to be approved by the 
Soviet Military Administration prior to the October opening of school. The Order also 
required that the “Curriculum for each school be planned out and submitted to the Soviet 
Military Administration through the DVV by September 15, 1945.”24 The DVV pointed 
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out that in the Soviet Zone of Germany there was a strong corps of teachers who had 
worked in school earlier in Germany’s history. The DVV was also setting up an 
apprentice training program, which “organized consistent democratic principles in 
education and in upbringing” and “revealed the reactionary path of Nazism, the fascist 
racial ideology, and the military character of the former German Reich.”25 Through Order 
No. 40 the Soviet Military Administration provided guidelines for the new schools that 
formed in fall of 1945 and also helped structure the new educational system and set it on 
a path toward what it called anti-fascist democracy.   
 The Soviet Military Administration dictated much of the initial work that was 
done to help set up the school system again. By getting involved with the educational 
system, the Soviet Military Administration could influence the future trajectory of 
education in the East. This urgency to rebuild a new, stronger educational system can be 
seen in the widespread purges of the teaching profession. Clearly the Soviet Military 
Administration and the KPD were interested in completely undoing the Nazi party, but at 
the same time this gave them the opportunity to install those teachers they believed were 
best fit to educate the future of Germany. The Neulehrer program demonstrates the 
interest of the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD in creating a strong, 
politically sound corps of teachers. This followed the other developments taking place 
across the Soviet Zone in that the Soviet Military Administration was working to build a 
solid foundation of politically reliable Germans. Organizations to help centralize activity 
in the Soviet Zone are seen in other spheres of society, but what is unique to the Soviet 
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Zone is how more upfront the educational system becomes in its relationship with the 
Soviet Union and its path toward the making of socialism.  
By 1946 the Neulehrer program developed more structure and gave teachers a 
better sense for the school system they were entering. More experienced teachers coming 
out of anti-fascist schools in Moscow were “thrown into” to help to train these Neulehrer 
and get them into the new educational system. Neulehrer were assigned mentors, 
Altlehrer, who were established teachers and were trusted by the new German 
Administration. The Neulehrer were observed by the Altlehrer and vice versa. Both 
mentor and mentee discussed pedagogical issues and specific problems they were 
experiencing in the classroom. Beyond experiential learning, Neulehrer spent their 
mornings learning about pedagogical and methodological issues as well as listening to 
lectures on political topics strictly associated with the Marxist-Leninist ideology that was 
taught in the Soviet Zone school system. The afternoons were spent on teaching exercises 
and drills.26 Through this new training system for new school teachers, the Soviet Zone 
was soon producing politicized teachers who were capable of influencing a young 
generation.  
These politicized teachers and other politically reliable Germans were occupying 
positions of power in the new educational system. This caused concern among some 
Germans and, again, the West because by filling the administration with Communists, 
educational activity did not appear democratic. Wandel assuaged these concerns in July 
1946 by stating that “The basic ideas of the new school laws and the new developments 
of the German schools are not inventions of our day and not contrived plans of [the 
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KPD]. We have certainly provided our opinion, but…our new school is founded on very 
old ideas.”27 Though the educational system at this point appeared to be along a more 
direct path of socialist development, KPD functionaries were adamant that they were 
preserving a historically-based, uniquely German system.   
The Law for the Democratization of the German School was established in May 
1946 and set out some key points that defined the new democratic school. It emphasized 
the democratic nature of the new educational system and laid out a vision for the future of 
German education that was inclusive for all.  
The creation of a new, free, democratic Germany – the only path to national 
rebirth and unity of our people – requires the fundamental democratization of 
German schools. The new democratic schools must be free of all elements of 
militarism, imperialism, and racism. They must be built so that all children, girls 
and boys…with no difference about the wealth of their parents, are guaranteed the 
same right to education…”28 
 
 The goal set out for the German democratic school was to teach students to be 
independent thinkers and responsible citizens who were competent and ready to put 
themselves at the service of all their people. Benita Blessing argues that the Law for the 
Democratization of the German School marked a real change. The pre-1945 German 
school system could never have been considered a place for youths to learn democracy 
and become free citizens who are aware of their responsibilities to society and confident 
in their own place because the power of the old class system was in place.29 The Law for 
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the Democratization of the German School highlighted the character of the educational 
system built in the Soviet Zone because of its focus on inclusion and the development of 
conscious German citizens. The structure of the educational system further supplemented 
these goals by working to standardize the system for students through the Einheitsschule.  
  The Einheitsschule was based on the understanding that the school was central to 
the construction of a German national consciousness.30 The Einheitsschule consisted of a 
Kindergarten, Grundschule and then Berufsschule or Oberschule. The Grundschule was 
obligatory for all children. It prepared the basics of German, History, Geography, 
Biology, Physics, Chemistry, Math and a foreign language. In the seventh or eighth year 
of Grundschule the students chose a second foreign language to study.31 Students were 
able to choose between a three-year part-time study at the Berufsschule or four years at 
the Oberschule. Part-time study at the Berufsschule combined school work with an 
apprenticeship, thereby preparing its students for a profession in East German society. In 
contrast, the Oberschule was four full years of study within which were three divisions 
for specialization: classics, modern languages, and mathematics/science. It was the 
Oberschule that prepared students for continued study at University. The Einheitschule 
helped to abolish the access the privileged classes had to secondary education. According 
to the German Communists, the old school system had not been accessible to the working 
class, peasant, and even the lower middle class. This new educational system allowed the 
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urban and rural working classes to overcome their long standing disadvantage and opened 
to them genuine opportunities for secondary and higher education.32   
Talking about the Soviet Zone, Alan Nothnagle describes its approach to 
education through the use of significant people in history and through textbooks as a type 
of indoctrination, and describes the way in which emphasis on Marxist-Leninist ideology 
remained strong throughout the existence of the DDR. He uses the word Parteilichkeit, 
which the SED defined as: 
…a theoretical-methodological principle; it demands that one approach all 
questions of societal life from the standpoint of the interests of the working class, 
its struggle for peace, societal progress, and the establishment of Socialism and 
Communism.33 
 
Parteilichkeit was most often emphasized in the textbooks used by students in the Soviet 
Zone through examples such as the anti-fascist Communist leader Ernst Thälmann. The 
historical foundation of this new ideology was built into the educational system so that all 
of the reforms taking place in the Soviet Zone could be justified.34 The rhetoric the 
schools directed at the youths was meant to condemn fascism as a party ideology bent on 
killing Communism. In school it was enough to know that fascism was wrong and the 
anti-fascists were right without being asked to consider why.35 The Soviet Military 
Administration and the KPD worked to instill this idea throughout the new curriculum 
with a new approach to the history of Germany and the relationship between the Nazi 
Party and the Communists. 
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The issue of curriculum, particularly how to teach German history, was one that 
affected all Allies. For the 1945-1946 school year all the Allied powers decided to 
suspend history education. This policy was adopted because the Nazi version of German 
history had been full of falsifications based on race theory and militarism. All traces of 
these approaches needed to be removed from history books and curricula. The lack of 
qualified teachers and the slow rate at which new teachers were being trained exacerbated 
this issue. To make effective change to the history curriculum required so much work that 
students could not be taught history until a completely new course was adopted. The 
Allied powers agreed on this suspension and the necessity to change the curriculum, but 
the leaders of the Soviet Union wanted to teach a different version of history than that 
accepted in the Western Zones. The curriculum promoted by the Soviet leaders and their 
German Communist cadres approached Nazism as representing the corruption of 
capitalism and thus in some sense blamed the economic system for leading Germany 
down an immoral path.36 This motivated them to develop their own separate goals for 
history education in 1946, which was framed as a curriculum for all of Germany.  
The DVV produced in July 1946 Richtlinien für den Unterricht in Deutscher 
Geschichte (Guidelines for the Curriculum of German History), written by Paul Wandel, 
which described how the Soviet Zone was going to correct the way history was taught by 
the Nazis. The new approach went beyond the study of National Socialism and Hitler’s 
policy. The SED wanted to introduce Marxist-Leninist ideology into the entire 
curriculum, leading up to the condemnation of the monopoly of capitalism, which was 
presented as the reason for the downfall of Germany. The discussion about National 
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Socialism in the Richtlinien centered around the argument that the Nazi Party was an 
“imperialist and capitalist Party that prepared and executed a war of conquest in the 
interest of monopoly capital.” There was no mention of the Holocaust in the Richtlinien, 
implying that this was an area that might be ignored.37 The DVV sustained substantial 
criticism from the Western Zones, where educationists did not believe all the problems of 
Nazism were economically based. They believed that the Richtlinien were an 
oversimplification of history and that more factors needed to be considered in the 
downfall of German society under the Nazi Party.38 Despite skepticism from the West, 
the DVV proceeded with its interpretation of German history. The Richtlinien were 
supplemented with discussions about how Germany should deal with reconstruction, 
again imposing a particular interpretation on what was to be taught in the classroom.   
The DVV continued to try to instill its version of history in East Germany by 
facilitating discussion of prominent Communist leaders. The KPD created a cult around 
Marx and Engels and stressed their German origins to emphasize that Communism was 
authentically German. It also focused on German Communists who had been significant 
during the Hitler years. John Rodden, a historian of East German education, notes that 
German Communist heroes became “atheistic substitutes for saints” and were 
memorialized in East German culture and enshrined in the textbooks of the schools.39 The 
socialist hero held in the highest esteem was Ernst Thälmann. He “[represented] the type 
of proletarian leader who [was]…always closely bound up with the thoughts and feelings 
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of his class.”40 Ernst Thälmann was spoken about with great reverence and was 
highlighted his significance in the struggle of the working class people was highlighted. 
He was a relatable figure and therefore could be easily implanted into everyday life. 
Wilhelm Pieck spoke particularly highly of Thälmann, as when he wrote that: 
Ernst Thälmann was a genuine people’s revolutionary. He understood in the most 
popular way the question of the struggle against imperialism and militarism, for 
freedom and international understanding, for democracy and unity of the working 
class in the development of all people. So he joined in the international worker’s 
movement, in the development of international solidarity against the growing 
danger of a new imperialist war.41 
 
Through such high praise of Communists from the past, the KPD emphasized the 
qualities they wanted to cultivate in the German people. Placing the focus on such 
“socialist heroes” opened the door for the steady infiltration of communist ideology into 
the school. Thus, the East German schools and curricula began to openly follow a path 
toward the making of socialism.   
Joel Agee, the American born stepson of Communist Party member Bodo Uhse, 
spent part of his childhood in East Germany, and his memoir encapsulates all of the 
concerns surrounding the educational system that have been discussed thus far. Though 
his own educational career was rather tumultuous, he speaks of his and his younger step-
brother Stefan’s early experience in the East German schools. He writes that “All East 
Germans were informed of what the Nazis had done” in a way that emphasized that Nazis 
had been repressive to all German workers and anti-fascists. Agee even discusses the visit 
of a former concentration camp inmate and how that particularly affected his younger 
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brother.42 This former concentration camp inmate represented the strong German man 
that the regime wanted to portray to all students. He had survived the concentration 
camps and he was able to tell students of his success now. The message seemed to be that 
the Nazis had tried to break him, but he had prevailed and in the same way the rest of 
Germany could break from its Nazi past and prevail as a leading nation in the world. The 
focus of his speech was less on the Nazi Party than on the future. It looked toward the 
possibilities of going ahead to socialism instead of back toward Nazism. Providing 
German students with a first hand account of the atrocities that took place in their country 
by their own people worked to deter them from Nazi ideology, and, it was hoped, would 
make them see the value of Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
Such institutional changes were taking place at the university level as well as at 
the primary school level. The university was particularly reconstructed to be more 
inclusive of working class students and giving them an opportunity to receive a quality 
education. Previously, Germany’s educational system virtually excluded the working 
class from opportunities to further their studies. The Gymnasium had been open mainly 
to the children of the bourgeoisie and that gave only these students the best access to a 
university. In the reformed school system of the Soviet Zone the children of urban or 
rural workers and those persecuted by the Nazis were to be given priority to enter the 
university, while non-proletarians who had not been members of the Nazi party or 
associated organizations and members of the Hitler Youth were to be given the lowest 
priority for admission. Nominal Nazis, who were sorted out, or former officers could only 
be admitted to university after close individual examination. Former active Nazis and so-
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called “enemies of democracy” were not to be admitted into any university.43 These 
“affirmative action” quotas were introduced in order to end the reign of the bourgeoisie 
while also strengthening the working class.44 This was an important goal for the new 
Germany, but as with the other areas of development in the Soviet Zone, change would 
come gradually. 
 There was an effort to open new programs at the universities catering to working 
class students. One such democratizing program was the Arbeiter und Bauern Fakultäten 
(Worker and Peasant Faculties) founded in 1947. These were created in order to give 
traditionally underrepresented groups the preparation necessary to go to university.45 The 
implementation of this program showcased the shift away from condemnation of former 
Nazis and an interest in rehabilitating people and finding ways to privilege the working 
class. In 1949 the Arbeiter und Bauern Fakultäten became more directly political.46 The 
DVV created guidelines for these Worker and Peasant Faculties in May 1949. A student 
in the program studied for three years, with a test at the end of each year and a 
cumulative test on the completion of the three years. The DVV organized a single 
curriculum for the Arbeiter und Bauern Fakultäten that applied to all programs in the 
Soviet Zone. The program was free and actually provided stipends for students based on 
their social status, their technical qualifications, and their activity in democratic 
reconstruction.47 Such efforts to include the working class in universities demonstrates 
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the shift that had taken place by 1949 toward socialism. It was about officially 
empowering the working classes and raising their class consciousness.   
 The curriculum at the University level changed for all students, not just those 
coming from the working class. In order to meet the serious needs in public health after 
the postwar rise of disease and also the shortage of medical personnel caused by the de-
Nazification process, the science and medicine departments in postwar Universities were 
some of the earliest to be restructured after the war. By 1946, history and psychology 
departments were rebuilt. Russian language was required so it became necessary to train 
Germans to teach Russian and other Slavic languages. The hope was that by increasing 
the number of Germans who understood Russian, communication between the Soviets 
and Germans would increase. The transition toward more socialist tendencies in 
educational policy can be seen from 1947 onward, starting with new social science 
courses which were created for the purpose of training students to work in the new East 
German administration or to be teachers of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The SED also 
created the Scientific Research Institute for Social Science, later to be named the Institute 
for Social Sciences, which held lectures for students on Marxist-Leninist ideology. This 
seemed to signal a transition away from the errors of Nazism and a focus on the 
possibility of socialism in Germany. 
 After a few years the educational system became less concerned with past 
affiliation, just as the de-Nazification process became less concerned about the Nazi past 
of each of individual. By late 1946, 54 percent of new faculty belonged to the SED.48 The 
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teaching profession ultimately became a mix of new teachers and former Nazi teachers 
who were regarded as nominal participants in the Nazi atrocities. Regardless of a 
teacher’s past affiliation the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD now were more 
concerned with following Wandel’s criteria for strong teachers to advance Marxist-
Leninist ideology than with a teacher’s possible Nazi past. In early 1947 it became a 
requirement that democratic schools in the Soviet Zone hire teachers who were willing to 
be “political [pioneers] of especially great activity.”49 Political affiliation with the SED 
would almost ensure a person a job in the new schools or other institutions in the Soviet 
Zone. As for the student body, political affiliation to the SED and/or political activity 
helped their chances of admissions to university level education, which in turn would 
help secure them a good job in the East German administration. The admission criteria 
for university sought out Germans of the working class, but by 1948 it became equally 
important to show a certain degree of support for the SED. This was particularly 
important for former Nazis because if they could demonstrate unflinching support for 
SED policy they could be admitted to University conditionally.50 The SED’s insistence 
on the significance of political party affiliation as it relates to work and university 
admissions demonstrates how the Soviet Zone headed toward a path to socialism 
divergent from the original Allied plans for Germany.  
 The educational system in the Soviet Zone of Germany was significantly shaped 
by the de-Nazification process and then was used throughout the late 1940s as a tool to 
teach children the wrongness of the Nazi Party and the rightness of Communist party 
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ideals. Such ideals were encouraged from the beginning through the teaching of Russian 
language and current events. There was an effort to maintain the character of German 
education as it had been founded since the 19th century. This gave the educational system 
a unique German quality despite the influence of the Soviet Military Administration over 
its functions. The importance of changing the educational system and using it as a tool to 
help rebuild Germany along an anti-fascist path was understood from the beginning. 
Though indoctrination in new ideas was slow in the beginning and rather subtle, the 
controlled versions of World War II history that were taught and the use of concentration 
camp survivors to give first-hand accounts of Nazi atrocities worked to solidify the 
negative image of the Nazi party. The effort to change the way students thought about the 
future of Germany was an ongoing challenge and one that was taken on at all levels of 
education from the beginning of the occupation in 1945.  
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Chapter 5: 
 
Cultural Reeducation in the Soviet Zone 
 
Culture was, and still is today, a central part of Germany identity. After World 
War II the KPD took it upon themselves to help reeducate the people about the greatness 
of Germany’s culture. Much had been suppressed or forgotten during the Nazi years. If 
Germany was to rebuild itself into a strong nation again, the people had to rediscover the 
greatness of their culture from the past. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, 
efforts to rebuild Germany were often initially grassroots initiatives that were then taken 
over, centralized and controlled by the Party and the Soviet rulers. The same trend is seen 
in the development of the cultural sphere of Germany. The Soviet Military 
Administration and the KPD took the opportunity to help reshape German culture in their 
own image and proceeded to create institutions and administrations to oversee cultural 
development. In this chapter I will discuss the establishment of administrative 
departments by the Soviet Military Administration and German Communists that helped 
lay the foundation for cultural changes, but also were connected with the increasing 
regulation of German artists and cultural institutions. A growing number of restrictions 
led to the domination of Soviet style art in East Germany, which affected certain cultural 
institutions. While Germans were able to run their own institutions and administrations 
throughout the Soviet Zone of Occupation, the influence of the Soviet Union could never 
be avoided.  
Culture was one of the many aspects of German life to see a spontaneous revival 
in May 1945. The Reichskulturkammer (Chamber of Culture) was revived in the Soviet 
sector of Berlin immediately after the war. Under the Nazi party the Reichskulturkammer 
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was used as a central cultural and propaganda administration. It regulated cultural 
developments, but this was an organization that was run by the intellectuals, not through 
laws or the police. The intellectuals worked independently in the Reichskulturkammer to 
create art for the public and the state only ensured that these artists remained in line with 
general Nazi cultural guidelines. The propaganda functions of the Reichskulturkammer 
are evident in the state’s supervision of the artists and the regulation of the art that could 
be produced for the public. Membership in the Reichskulturkammer was required for all 
who contributed to the creation, reproduction, intellectual or technical preservation or 
sale of cultural goods. Though this was an institution for artists to carry out “public 
tasks,” ultimately it was an extension of the Nazi Party organizational structure.1 The 
Reichskulturkammer sustained a lot of damage during the final Battle of Berlin, but it 
was still functioning, as is demonstrated by its early reoccupation by Germans 
immediately after the war. 
Elizabeth Dilthy was the first self-proclaimed occupant of the 
Reichskulturkammer after World War II. A woman with a strong Nazi past, she managed 
to survive only a few days in her position in the Reichskulturkammer by producing false 
Russian credentials. She was ousted by Klemens Herzberg, who also wanted a say in the 
development of the Reichskulturkammer. A Jew in Nazi Germany, he tried 
unsuccessfully to escape during the war and spent those years in hiding. He reemerged in 
May 1945 ready to rebuild. After discussing the importance of the Reichskulturkammer 
with the Soviet military, he was given instruction to seize the building from Dilthy. After 
questionable behavior on the part of Herzberg, the Russian military removed him from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Alan E. Steinweis, Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, 
Theater, and the Visual Arts (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 44-45. 
	   109 
power within a month of occupation and ran cultural operations on its own.2 After the 
ousting of these two German leaders things settled down in the Reichskulturkammer and 
it served as a central cultural institution for about three months. 
In those first months after the war the Reichskulturkammer was used as an 
institution where Berlin artists and intellectuals could gather. It acted as a club, a place to 
eat and a formal meeting space. Its files also held information on every German who had 
been permitted to engage in artistic, literary and journalistic activity in the Third Reich.3 
Beyond its role as a cultural center, the Reichskulturkammer also acted as the center for 
the distribution of ration cards, which was of the utmost importance for starving 
Germans. Artists were given the first rations, meaning larger pieces of bread with more 
meat and vegetables. These larger rations were based on political logic. The intelligentsia 
and the artist community needed to be won over after the war, and providing for their 
immediate needs made it was more likely that they could be convinced to stay in the 
Soviet Zone. The Soviet Military Administration saw the power of having control of the 
cultural arena in Germany. Because of this realization, the Reichskulturkammer changed 
into a new institution that would be of more importance, the Kulturbund (Cultural 
Union).4  
The Kulturbund was founded on July 3, 1945 by the Soviet Military 
Administration and KPD with the stated goal of bringing about the renewal of culture in 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation. The Kulturbund became a means to organize the 
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intelligentsia around the anti-fascist, democratic principles being championed by the 
regime. In the view of the KPD leaders this would make it easier to bring the 
intelligentsia under Communist party control.5 Johannes Becher, a well-known German 
Expressionist poet who had spent the Nazi years in Moscow, was appointed the first head 
of the Kulturbund. Becher was a man who related well to the bourgeoisie and whom the 
bourgeoisie considered one of their own. Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues that because of 
Becher’s wide ranging connections, the bourgeoisie did not feel threatened by his 
leadership in postwar cultural politics. Instead they felt reassured that one of their own 
was working with the new rulers of Germany.6 His approach to de-Nazification was 
unique in that he believed in the rehabilitation of Nazis as opposed to their aggressive 
removal. His approach to the renewal of culture was similar. Becher was unusual because 
he did not seem interested in partisan politics or self-aggrandizement, but instead 
believed it was possible to follow a uniquely German path of culture that would lead to 
the triumph of antifascist, democratic values.7 In the “Manifest zur Gründung des 
‘Kulturbundes’,” the founding document of the Kulturbund issued on July 4, 1945, 
Becher laid out the demands of the new organization. He admonished the intelligentsia 
for not trying hard enough to overthrow the power of the Third Reich in the past and laid 
out the tasks for the present and the future. He stated, “The Cultural Union for the 
Democratic Renewal of Germany places the highest of national duties on the 
intelligentsia: these men and women must come together with an honest, unfaltering will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5David Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992), 86.	  	  
6Schivelbusch, In a Cold Crater, 78.	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet Occupied Germany, 1945-1949, 86. 
	   111 
for spiritual and cultural renewal along with a commitment to contribute all their energy 
to the cause…It demands a fundamental change and transformation of all areas of life and 
knowledge.”8 The name “Cultural Union for the Democratic Renewal of Germany” in 
itself implies a desire to have a distinctly German culture emerge from the postwar 
world.9   
The construction of the Kulturbund and the overall success of cultural reeducation 
in the Soviet Zone relied upon the KPD’s efforts to make the German people believe in 
the greatness of their culture again. Alan Nothnagle refers to this as the “myth of Kultur.” 
The KPD asserted that Goethe, Schiller, Bach and Beethoven were in fact representatives 
of Germany rather than absolutely exceptional individuals.10 Walter Ulbricht made this 
point when he declared: “The rebirth of our people means acquiring the spiritual treasures 
of the great thinkers of our people again. Nazism has done everything possible to cut off 
Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Marx from our people. May our people now strengthen 
themselves on the works of our classical authors…”11 The use of the words “our people” 
and the positive way in which he refers to these great writers emphasized that the German 
people were all a part of a great past culture. Nothnagle argues that by going back to 
cultural leaders before the 20th century the new rulers of Germany were attempting to 
inspire the people to recover their history and Kultur beyond the dark years of the Third 
Reich.12  
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The KPD needed the help of the old intelligentsia, facilitated by the Soviet 
Military Administration, to achieve this goal.13  Artists, writers, musicians, and any 
important person who contributed to the development of culture in Germany, many now 
in exile, were sought out. These men and women were praised, offered financial help, and 
treated as public celebrities who contributed to the great anti-fascist, democratic German 
culture that had existed outside Germany during the Nazi years. The problem was 
persuading these men and women to come back home. In June 1945 efforts were made to 
persuade Thomas Mann, then in the United States, to come back to Germany, but to no 
avail. There were efforts also to bring the more left-leaning Heinrich Mann, Thomas’s 
brother, back from the United States, but poor health made it impossible for Heinrich to 
travel.14 All the while many intellectuals were leaving the East for the West in 1945. Yet 
many celebrated German artists chose to stay in the Soviet Zone. As long as they were 
friendly to the party, these members of the intelligentsia were compensated with salaries 
that far surpassed that of a worker. University professors could retain their positions and 
have significant influence over their institutions. Leftist intellectual Hans Mayer (1907-
2001) from Tübingen was one professor to join the ranks of intellectuals in East 
Germany. An upper class Jew, he fled to Geneva, Switzerland in 1934 to escape the Nazi 
regime. In 1945 he returned to Germany, initially to the Western Zones, but several years 
later he accepted a position as a professor at the University of Leipzig in the East. In 1948 
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he began his new life in the Soviet Zone, where he was driven by taxi to and from the 
University in Leipzig every day, a luxury not afforded to most.15  
The playwright Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) also returned to the Soviet Zone of 
Germany. Having fled to Scandinavia during the Nazi years, eventually settling in Zurich 
and the United States for a time, he chose to return to the Soviet Zone in 1947 of his own 
accord. He was a communist sympathizer and his political background made it difficult 
for him to enter West Germany. The United States Military Administration denied Brecht 
an entry permit into the U.S sector, including the area of West Berlin. Being denied entry 
by the U.S Military Administration, and the fact that the East held the most important 
theaters in Germany, influenced Brecht’s decision to reside in the Soviet Zone.16 Philip 
Glahn writes that Brecht chose to live in East Germany because, while the West was 
polite to him, the East was welcoming and seemed to need him. As the Soviet Zone 
became increasingly restrictive of the arts and what was acceptable, Brecht’s relationship 
with the authorities became more tense. He proposed to the Berlin government in January 
1949 the idea of creating a Berlin Ensemble theater company that would bring prominent 
actors to the city. The mayor of Berlin did not respond to him and only expressed 
skepticism toward the project as a whole. Glahn writes that Brecht felt he was met with a 
“less than enthusiastic response.” Despite the hostility he may have felt from the SED, 
Brecht remained a proponent of life in the East and wrote to his friend Erwin Piscator to 
persuade him to move to East Berlin in February 1949. He says, “Food and housing are 
no problem here for our sort of people. You’d be just as well off as I am. And you’d be 
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really welcome. You’re badly needed.”17 Eventually, the Berlin Ensemble received 
approval in April 1949 from the SED, but one can only speculate about why the initial 
reaction toward Brecht and his cultural ideas was hostile.18 His presence in the Soviet 
Zone and the plays he wrote and mounted there helped the KPD achieve its goals for the 
development of cultural life in Germany.  
The second line of KPD and Soviet effort was to democratize culture and to get 
the working class to participate in the cultural renewal as well. Johannes Becher was 
skilled in relating to German intellectuals, but it was Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960), a 
leader of the KPD, who best related to the working class. He began his career in the late 
19th century as a carpenter and initially joined the Social Democratic Party. He joined the 
KPD after a stint in prison and then in exile during World War I for his vocal opposition 
to the war. In 1933 Pieck went into exile once again in Paris and then in Moscow in 1935. 
He returned to Germany in 1945 and became co-chairman of the SED and eventual 
President of the German Democratic Republic in 1949. Pieck championed the idea of a 
unique German path to cultural renewal for the purposes of destroying the corrupt 
intellectual and moral identity of Nazism.19 He declared that it was necessary “to clean 
away all fascist and reactionary debris from cultural life, to withdraw from libraries and 
museums all those demons of racial fanaticism, the glorification of reactionary 
Prussianism and the patriotism and militarism that the corrupt Nazi ideology was built 
on.”20 He included all the people in the cultural plan for Germany, not just the 
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intelligentsia. He insisted that this was necessary because without the people the renewal 
would not be successful.  
All structures of antifascism and democratic power, no matter which Party or 
religious denomination they represent, whether worker or intellectual, whether 
peasant or craftsman, must come together and bring a strong, efficient unity to all 
cultural groups. Only on this platform of unity and spirit will true cultural life be 
realized in a real, rewarding way.21 
 
Pieck said that the Kulturbund should pursue this mission of unity and progress toward a 
more genuine cultural life in order to encourage people to participate in society. It would 
help the people believe that society could be built in their own image.  
Despite these attempts by the KPD to rebuild German cultural life, the Soviet 
Military Administration was uneasy and tried to establish its own control over the 
cultural arena. It created a Propaganda and Censorship Department by Order No. 29 in 
August 29. This allowed the Soviet Military Administration to establish an official basis 
for shaping the cultural renewal and also to control the spontaneous work taking place. It 
conducted and monitored propaganda among the German people via film, radio and print 
media and also censored cultural material.22 The Propaganda Department helped field 
questions regarding the democratization of Germany and all questions about running 
political parties, and more broadly all political work among the German population. 
According to Norman Naimark, it was the largest office under the Soviet Military 
Administration, with 1,500 Soviet employees. The sheer size of the Propaganda 
Department suggests the influence it had over the Soviet Zone and demonstrates the 
important role of the cultural sphere in Soviet eyes. It was run by Sergei Tiul’panov 
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(1901-1987), who was an up and coming figure in the Soviet Union. He had been in 
charge of a program to win the support of German prisoners of war throughout World 
War II, but he was also known for his familiarity with the German language and German 
culture. He was a strong supporter of the KPD/SED and particularly of Walter Ulbricht. 
This close relationship with German culture, and the KPD, helped the Propaganda 
Department as it sought to influence and even gain control over the masses. Tiul’panov’s 
work was central to securing the KPD’s image in the Soviet Zone in the late 1940s.23  
The creation of a department for propaganda and information was not a radical 
idea for the Soviet Military Administration. Similar developments were taking place in 
the Western sectors of Germany in the summer of 1945. The Psychological Warfare 
Department of the United States Military Administration was issuing directives about 
censorship and propaganda from the beginning of May 1945. Its Directive No. 1 for the 
Propaganda Policy of Overt Allied Information Services was intended to reeducate 
Germans through the presentation of irrefutable facts about the extent to Germany’s war 
guilt. The difference between the United States efforts and those of the Soviet Union lay 
in their methods and approaches. In the words of David Pike, “the Americans were 
clearly aware that…information should be skillfully packaged and disseminated in order 
to avoid alienating the Germans with ‘overt’ allied Propaganda.”24 If the propaganda was 
obvious, then the work of the Americans would have the opposite effect on the German 
population. The Americans did not want the Germans to transfer their animosity toward 
the Nazi party onto the United States Military Administration. The Soviet Military 
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Administration, on the other hand, openly used the word propaganda and used overt 
publicity to try to transform the public. It was not until 1946 that the Soviet Military 
Administration changed the name of the department to Information Directorate instead of 
Propaganda and Censorship. David Pike argues that they believed “information” sat 
better with the German people.25  
On September 4, 1945, the Soviet Military Administration issued Order No. 51. It 
intended to remove all Nazi influence from the cultural sphere while simultaneously 
introducing true democratic art. For the Soviet Military Administration this included the 
introduction of Soviet art. This order setting out Soviet goals for art had three main 
components: 
1)   Complete liberation of art from all Nazi, racist, militaristic and other reactionary 
ideas and tendencies 
2)   Active use of art in the struggle against fascism and for the reeducation of the 
German people in the meaning of true democracy 
3)   The introduction of Russian art into the [German] art world26 
 
 Cultural institutions in Germany had to register with the Soviet Military Administration 
in order to be recognized in the Soviet Zone. These institutions included theaters and 
music ensembles as well as acting troupes and individual musicians. Art exhibitions 
could not be displayed without proper registration with the Soviet officials.27 This put 
restrictions on any attempts to revive or continue German artistic institutions in the 
Soviet Zone. While the creation of the Propaganda Department by the Soviet Military 
Administration preceded Order No. 51 by roughly two months, the order synthesized the 
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Department’s mission into a simple statement. It addressed issues of implementation, 
delegated tasks to both the Soviet and German Administrations, and gave responsibilities 
to local authorities and provincial administrations.28 Such strict regulation of cultural life 
in the Soviet Zone of Germany was meant to ensure that the radical ideology of the Nazi 
Party was completely eradicated from the public mind, and also to allow the Soviet 
Military Administration to begin work to establish a new ideology. 
Parallel to the calls for Germany to recognize the greatness of German culture, we 
can see clear signs immediately after the war of the Soviet Union’s belief immediately 
after the war in the supremacy of its own culture and particularly the doctrine of socialist 
realism in the arts. Socialist Realism came into use after the revolutionary period when 
society was trying to remake itself in the great drive for social construction at the 
beginning of the 1930s. Instead of art and literature that promoted the values and used the 
artistic style of the pre-revolutionary world, there was a need for a culture that promoted 
the new socialist ideal. As C. Vaughn James argues, it was no longer necessary to make 
history; that had been done throughout the course of the revolutions. It was now time to 
interpret history, and this could be done through socialist realism, which would help build 
a relationship between the artist and the process of building a new society.29  The aim of 
socialist realism was to assist the people and the Communist party to create a new 
society, a better type of man, and a more perfect world. The experience of the working 
class and its struggle to achieve socialism was a main theme of socialist realist art. After 
World War II, the Soviet Union brought this cultural influence to its occupation zones in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Pike, “Censorship in Soviet Occupied Germany,” 230-231. 	  	  
29C. Vaughn James, Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theories (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 
88. 
	   119 
Eastern Europe, and especially to Germany, where the style was already familiar because 
of similarities to Nazi art.  
The Red Army had taken over the radio stations in May 1945 because radio was 
the quickest way to reach the people after the war. The radio station in Berlin, Radio 
Berlin, was quickly put in the hands of German Communists, with Hans Mahle, the 
youngest member of the Ulbricht Group, appointed to head the station. He attested that 
there was no organization in the occupation of Radio Berlin, just that it was used to 
promote the new order. Mahle tried to balance maintaining new programming for the new 
Germany with some of the old ways of Radio Berlin so as not to make the station seem 
like an overtly Communist institution.30 The majority of Mahle’s staff were non-
Communists, particularly Social Democrats, which helped to promote an anti-fascist, 
democratic image.31 While the administration of  Radio Berlin seemed diverse in political 
allegiance, in reality the station, like all radio in the Soviet Zone, was pro-Soviet and pro-
Communist from the outset. Mahle, head of Radio Berlin in 1945, himself was subject to 
Soviet censorship of what he told the people. Historian Nicholas Schlosser suggests that 
for the Russians, radio acted as a mirror for the masses while they were still developing a 
democratic self-understanding, but that mirror had a strong prescriptive character. The 
people needed guidance after the tumultuous twelve year Nazi Reich, and radio served as 
the leader. While radio programs did not praise communism outright, they often spoke 
highly of the Red Army and the Soviet Union.32 Radio offered a subtle way of trying to 
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influence the masses and to encourage them to believe in the rightness of the Soviet 
Union’s ideology.  
Historians can get a good insight into the character of radio broadcasts in Berlin 
from Victor Klemperer’s detailed diary. Klemperer was a German man born as a Jew 
who later in his life converted to Protestantism. He was a professor who was removed 
from his job when the Nazi Party took power in Germany. He provided detailed diary 
accounts of his time during the Third Reich and the postwar period and they have 
provided invaluable information to historians and others studying German history. His 
account of what was being broadcast less than a month after German surrender shows 
heavy emphasis on the Red Army. In an entry for June 17, 1945, Klemperer writes that 
all he heard on the radio was in Russian, which he describes as a colorful language used 
to present Russian-centered news. The presentation made the news about the eradication 
of Nazis exciting and appealing to the audience, as it did with the news about Nazi 
atrocities, about the Red Army’s capture of fleeing Nazis, and about police 
interrogations.33 All of this news had a rousing anti-Nazi tone and depicted the Red Army 
as heroes in the fight against fascism.  
Other media outlets were controlled quickly by the Soviet Military Administration 
and trusted Communists in the months after occupation. In August 1945 the Soviet 
Military Administration issued Order No. 19, which called for “all leaders of official 
printing presses…to register with their local Soviet Military Administration Commander 
no later than August 10.” Additionally it stated that “leaders of the printing presses and 
publishing houses who do not register with the Soviet Military Administration by August 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33Victor Klemperer, Und so ist alles schwankend (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996), 9-10.  
	   121 
10 will face the strongest punishment.”34 Order No. 19 also issued the the following 
statement: “Only newspapers, books, magazines, posters, fliers, announcements and party 
literature that has been granted a license by the Soviet Military Administration will be 
allowed to publish.”35 David Pike argues that though these measures may seem extreme, 
it was the way in which the Soviet Military Administration chose to the link the control 
of publishing houses and printed material to a governing structure.36 Publishing houses 
were of particular interest to the Soviet Military Administration because of the role books 
could play in the reeducation of the German people. They were a way to expose ordinary 
German people to a consistently democratic worldview.37 Regulation of the publishing 
companies was a means to ensure there would be no Nazi propaganda and also to shape 
the nature of education and the new German society being built.   
Reconstruction of the film industry was a priority because film was an especially 
effective medium for propaganda. The Soviet Union immediately confiscated most film 
equipment as a part of the reparations it claimed as recompense for German acts of 
destruction in the Soviet Union during the war, thereby limiting the ability of the German 
film industry from the start. A Filmaktiv (Film council) met in October 1945 to discuss 
the reorganization of the film industry in light of the lack of physical equipment and 
minimal funds in Germany. The Filmaktiv created the Deutsche Film AG (German Film 
Company – DEFA), but had to accept the condition that it be entirely dependent upon the 
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Soviet Military Administration and the DVV for financial support. This gave the Soviet 
Military Administration the power to implant politically reliable men in positions of 
power and thus to dominate the film industry from the beginning.38 One of these reliable 
men was Alfred Lindemann. As a member of the Filmaktiv, he became dedicated to the 
KPD and its crusade to rebuild the film industry. He was placed on the board of DEFA 
and therefore had more influence over the films being produced for the German people. 
Lindemann was eventually removed from power over suspected corruption of DEFA 
finances. With Lindemann in charge or another politically reliable German in charge, the 
Russians could supervise and manage the finances of DEFA, while the German 
Communists could be trusted with the technicalities and the industry’s artistic 
development.39 This was a powerful and dynamic structure that contributed to the strong 
film propaganda output by DEFA throughout the 1940s.  
In February 1946 an article by one of the KPD leaders implied that German art 
was to be Sovietized and that for the immediate future there would be an impending 
infusion of socialist realist art. Although the term socialist realism was never used 
outright. Anton Ackermann imagined socialist realism influencing Germany, and the 
Soviet aesthetic underlay all conceptions of democratic art for the new Germany.40 In his 
article he praised the Soviet Union while recognizing the German people’s desire for 
their own unique art that reflected their culture. He used pointed language to reinforce the 
KPD’s cultural policy of anti-fascism and democracy, mostly by referring to Germany’s 
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disastrous past. He said the Nazis had used art as a way to way to oppress society and 
project the Thousand Year Reich that Hitler envisioned. But never again would art be 
used to strangle the freedom of the people.41 Instead Ackermann put forth a notion of the 
role of art drawn from Soviet society when he declared: “We see our ideal in an art that is 
socialist in content and realist in form.”42 This kind of art provided the people with a 
vision for the future, but it indicated that the future of Germany lay in socialism. 
Ackermann’s article suggests that socialist realist art was always the goal in the back of 
the KPD’s mind. Like other areas of society at the beginning of the occupation, even if 
the KPD had a vision for how society looked in the future, its leaders knew that the 
German people were not prepared for an immediate change. This is probably why 
Ackermann implied that a transition was to take place slowly and not outright. 
Film was significant to the cultural restructuring of society because, like radio, it 
offered a direct link to the people. In December 1945, the Soviet Military Administration 
brought the process of showing films under the Propaganda Administration. Though there 
was still resistance against any inundation of German society with Soviet film, this move 
by the Soviet Military Administration to control films signaled a tightening of control 
over cultural reeducation.43 In 1946 the film Die Mörder Sind Unter Uns (The Murderers 
are Among Us) debuted. Its anti-fascist message was apparent in the plot, in which a 
German man returns home from war and has to develop new sources of strength to fight 
in a different way for Germany by seeking vengeance for the time he spent in the military 
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under Nazi officers.44 This message was intended to strengthen the anti-fascist spirit in 
the Soviet Zone and sought to inculcate that spirit in all viewers throughout Germany. 
This desire to portray a strong Germany had to balance its expression with the Soviet 
Military Administration’s demands to display Russian strength. The Soviets understood 
film as a form of propaganda, and socialist realism could be used to transform the 
people’s thoughts on reality and encouraged socialist realism in that it was a “strong 
weapon for portraying the past and the future as it was supposed to be rather than as it 
actually was.” But the German people were strongly opposed to contemporary films with 
a socialist-realist message because they wanted to avoid the realistic depictions of war 
despite the overall positive message.45 Film could serve as a form of education in that it 
could instill in the German people a love for noble values and what was right after the 
war.  
In January 1947, Allied Command Order BK/o (47)16 was issued and it stated 
that political organizations in each of the four sectors of Berlin needed to be individually 
approved. This ensured that political power was still squarely under the control of the 
Allied Powers. This put the Kulturbund at the center of an Allied conflict because while 
the Americans considered it a political organization, the Soviets believed it was a cultural 
organization. If it were a political organization, then it would need to file for a license 
with the Soviet Military Administration. But by Soviet standards the Kulturbund was a 
cultural organization and therefore should be left unlicensed.46 Order BK/o (47)16 was 
released around the same time as the Truman Doctrine. This order was asking that 
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political influence to be kept in check, while President Truman was generally 
acknowledging the wide spread of Communist influence over the Eastern Bloc. These 
two actions together made a statement about the relationship between the East and the 
West in 1947. Suspicions were clearly running deeper and hostilities were growing more 
tense. The Allies had been willing to cooperate with one another, but with Order BK/o 
(47)16 a limit to this cooperation was defined.  
In an attempt to demonstrate to the West its democratic tendencies, the Soviet 
Military Administration approved the SED’s plan to call the First German Writer’s 
Congress in Berlin from October 4-8 1947. The SED leaders tried to use this opportunity 
to influence Western intellectuals and display their own cultural legitimacy to the rest of 
the world. Tensions were high between the East the West politically, so this was an 
opportunity to ease cultural relations. The East German men arranging the writer’s 
Congress were Alexander Abusch, a Communist functionary, and Günther Weisenborn, 
an anti-fascist poet. Both were members of the Kulturbund, which was still non-partisan, 
and emphasized the German humanist tradition as the Congress’s foundation. The 
Congress was presented as offering a possibility for a lasting coalition between liberals 
and communists. The Kulturbund envisioned the development of an organization of 
writers whose unity would provide an alternative to the political hostilities mounting in 
Germany. It was now imperative to convince those in the West of the legitimacy of the 
groups in the Soviet Zone.47 Andreas Agocs argues that the SED’s call for the Writer’s 
Congress was a hoax from the beginning. While cultural renewal was touted as a unifying 
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theme in the first years after the war, by 1947 invoking classical German culture was 
being used as a pillar for Germany’s division.48 It was a show to keep the West appeased 
for a time, but ultimately opinions were unchanged and German Communists backed by 
the Soviets continued to move forward in their efforts to communize East Germany.  
 In another area of the arts, a people’s theater movement was established in Berlin 
in May 1947, at least partly as a protest against what were seen as regime efforts to 
control the arts. There was general dissatisfaction with the Soviet Military 
Administration’s hold over cultural affairs during the occupation so it was hoped that 
these people’s theaters would give the people more influence over the reconstruction of 
cultural life. This movement also reflected a weakness in the actual work of the Soviet 
Military Administration. It had worked so hard to attract the intellectuals in East German 
society that it had failed to appeal to the masses. If Germans were going to the theater, it 
was the intellectuals, not the general public. In order to ensure that the masses were 
properly included, mass organizations such as the Kulturbund and the Free German Trade 
Union were in charge of leading these People’s Theaters and helping in the cultural 
reeducation of the people. Beyond that, it was hoped that these Peoples’ Theaters would 
lead the entire cultural movement in the Soviet Zone. If nothing else, the people hoped 
that these theaters would spark the revitalization of the theater system in Berlin, which 
had been lacking structure and direction after the destruction of war. Fritz Erpenbeck, a 
prominent author and member of the SED, led the crusade to make the People’s Theaters 
popular with the people. He argued that “the majority of people, especially the youths, 
still do not register the historical meaning of Germany’s liberation from Hitler’s 
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ideology. This is clouding the view of the present and the future.”49 In fact, these people’s 
theaters never amounted to much in the Soviet Zone of Germany, but the attempt to 
independently control the cultural political processes shows a desire to help reconstruct 
Germany in a new image.  
The People’s Theater initiative did not last long, despite attempts to use their 
vision for the future cultural development of Germany. The Soviet Military 
Administration was not supportive of independently founded German attempts to create a 
unique culture. It insisted that no performances debuted without the approval of the 
Soviet Military Administration. It began to establish Kunstbeiräte (artistic councils) to 
enforce their cultural initiatives. Through the DVV, these artistic councils promoted the 
vision of the Soviet Military Administration. These councils were meant to ensure that 
theater was directly enhancing the democratic renewal of Germany as defined by the 
Soviet Military Administration. They paid attention to young talent and censored any art 
with Nazi or militaristic tendencies.50 The creation of the artistic councils and other 
organizations centralized control over these German-founded organizations. This tighter 
system still allowed for the cultural development of the Soviet Zone, but there were now 
more restrictions. These restrictions continued the repression of democratic and 
spontaneous German cultural expression in the Soviet Zone and sent warning signs to the 
Western powers about the current trajectory of East Germany’s growth.  
 The propaganda being produced in the Soviet Zone was too overwhelming for the 
Western powers to ignore any longer. The film industry was clearly producing work in a 
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style of socialist realism and other media outlets, such as newspapers, were reporting just 
as much on the Soviet Union as they were on the developments within Germany. By 
October 1947, the West aired its distrust of Soviet aims by suggesting that the 
Kulturbund was being misused and opposed the East’s use of politically tainted cultural 
figures for lectures and events of the Kulturbund. The West wanted to use the Kulturbund 
to combat this growing influence and implant a more open vision of democratic ideals. 
Instead the Kulturbund was forced to file itself as a political institution under the Western 
Allied administration or cease to be recognized as a legitimate organization by the West. 
Since the Soviet Union viewed the Kulturbund as a genuine cultural organization, it did 
not comply with Western demands and therefore the West withdrew recognition from the 
Kulturbund in November 1947.51 The Western Military Administrations proceeded to 
denounce the Kulturbund and closed down the organization’s activity in the Western 
sections of Berlin. Conflict over the Kulturbund heightened the tensions between East 
and West, but in the Soviet Zone it had the separate effect of drawing German leaders in 
the Soviet Zone into greater acceptance of the idea of following the socialist path of the 
Soviet Union.  
Throughout 1948 the German people remained resistant to the new cultural ideal 
being implanted from above by the leaders in Soviet Zone. To combat this steady 
resistance, the SED started to be more forceful in exerting its influence throughout the 
different cultural industries. By the end of 1948 almost all key positions in the DEFA 
were filled by Communists.52 There was still uncertainty among the party’s cultural 
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leaders about how to use art to reeducate society, which caused many sudden radical 
shifts to take place in the film industry. Increasingly the goal came to be inculcating 
Marxist-Leninist ideology rather than anti-fascist ideology. By 1948 films were made to 
celebrate the new order and sought to raise the audience’s political consciousness. These 
films followed the socialist realist line of art that was standard in the Soviet Union and 
that fact demonstrated the increasingly close relationship developing between East 
Germany and the Soviet Union.53 The Soviet Military Administration exerted its control 
over German film by demanding that Soviet films be censored in their original Russian 
form and then be checked again once they had been translated into German. Anton 
Ackermann, alone among the German Communist leaders, believed that the people 
needed to see real Soviet art.54 By the end of 1948, this tumultuous period of defining 
German film revealed that there had been a transition from Germany’s National Socialist 
past to its Socialist future.   
 In August 1949, just months before the formation of the German Democratic 
Republic, the leaders of the Eastern Zone organized a 200th anniversary celebration of the 
birth of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Not only was he one of Germany’s most revered 
writers, but he was best known for the work he did in Weimar, an East German city. This 
was meant by the SED leaders as a demonstration for the West that Communists cared 
more about high culture than capitalists. The KPD members believed they were the real 
German patriots and they demonstrated their loyalty through an elaborate celebration. 
Involving as many citizens as possible was central to the success of this celebration as it 
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also would show the West the strength of the democracy that could be found in the 
East.55 The Goethe celebration was also intended to make the SED look better to East 
Germans by emphasizing the SED’s dedication to German culture and its preservation. 
The SED was using Goethe as a figurehead to suggest an identity of Marxist-Leninist 
thinking and the broad and humane vision of the great German thinker..56 All these 
themes were combined in a cultural festival for Goethe, but one through which the SED 
tried to burnish its own image. 
 Another example of the way the SED leaders tried to burnish their image was 
their decision to stage a youth festival in March 1949, five months before the Goethe 
bicentennial celebration. The youth festival was led by the FDJ and stressed to youth in 
the Soviet Zone the great importance of the impending Goethe anniversary. This festival 
provided more cultural exposure for youth and sought to provide an alternative to the pop 
culture of the West.57 Cultural activities were popular for youths in the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern bloc countries, but the Goethe celebration was a special opportunity to 
present to them lessons about the struggle for peace and democracy. FDJ leader Erich 
Honecker spoke at this event and in his memoir says that the FDJ was intentionally put in 
charge of this event so that it could lead the charge in youth cultural education.58 Otto 
Grotewohl also spoke and urged German youth to face the problems of the future, not run 
away from them. According to Grotewohl, it was the youth’s time to triumph over the 
grief and poverty that their history had left them. They had the chance to use their hands 
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and their heads to bring peace and progress to their Fatherland.59  Through these cultural 
events, the SED showed the younger generation that it highly valued youth and wanted to 
help the younger generation avoid the errors of the Nazi past. These propaganda events 
were popular within East Germany and the SED hoped they would bring German youth 
and the German people closer to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, they tended to cut off East 
German youth from contemporary culture and helped to make Western pop culture a 
much sought after underground commodity. 
 Large scale cultural events were especially popular in the Eastern Zone because 
they offered the chance to mobilize masses of people and suggest the existence of a 
community of Germans all dedicated to the same cause. It cannot be denied that these 
festivals were extravagant affairs. Communist mass events were seen as “the climax of 
nationwide propaganda campaigns” and thus were given special attention. Masses of 
singing and chanting people could not be ignored because they made everything seem 
possible and inevitable. But many of these citizens, like those participating in mass 
organizations, may have been a part of the cultural festivities or they felt they had to do it 
only because it seemed the correct thing to do. Nothnagle argues that there was no reason 
for the people to challenge the SED’s authority in these moments because the price for 
dissent was very high. Thousands of German people were all acting in the same way and, 
at least in that moment, many may have believed in the same vision for Germany. Not to 
attend and not to partake in the celebration meant to ignore their community.60 This was 
how the SED tried to draw the people onto a socialist path for Germany. They used 
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propaganda to make the people believe in the SED vision and told them that, if they all 
believed in the same ideals, then they could not be wrong.  
 Cultural rejuvenation in the Soviet Zone of Germany was enthusiastically 
undertaken by the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD from the first months 
after World War II. With the restructuring of the political landscape and the educational 
system, the development of cultural life added another facet of society that needed 
attention after the corruption of the Nazi Party. Despite the enthusiasm of the German 
people for starting reconstruction on their own, the Soviet Military Administration proved 
unwilling to trust the Eastern Zone on matters of German culture in the same way it had 
with the other spontaneous efforts of the people. The Kulturbund was a democratic 
organization created to appeal to all German zones of occupation and was meant to 
inspire the rebirth of cultural life. The eventual inception of Kunstbeiräte to oversee the 
theater movement indicated a centralization of power over the Soviet Zone. The Western 
Allies’ increasing skepticism about the activities of the Soviet Military Administration 
reflected the heightened tensions across Germany. The eventual decision by the West to 
denounce the Kulturbund was one more step in the ideological and political wall 
separating the West from the East. The intentions of the Soviet Military Administration 
and the KPD to Sovietize eastern Germany became more overt after this rejection of the 
symbolism of unity through the Kulturbund. The chasm between East and West 
continued to widen until the creation of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The formation of the German Democratic Republic in October 1949 stemmed 
from a variety of factors, which eventually came together to forge one end. From the 
beginning the Soviet Union was interested in instituting Communism in Germany so it 
would be a state sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Within a few years the Soviets decided 
that the only way they could be sure of this outcome was to have a German state ruled by 
Communists. Though the Soviet Union held to convictions of the supremacy of its own 
society and culture, it was willing to cooperate with the other Allied Powers in the initial 
months after World War II to work toward a unified and sovereign Germany. Among the 
key actions of the Potsdam meeting of the Big Three was the decision to carry out a wide 
ranging process of de-Nazification and the creation of the Allied Control Council. The 
Allied Control Council’s work to standardize the de-Nazification process and give it 
more organization demonstrated the collective effort of the Allies. It was in the 
implementation in the various zones that divisions between East and West grew. The 
leaders of the Eastern Zone were aggressive in carrying out de-Nazification purges of 
many people from their positions in society, and in their transition to a more 
rehabilitative society the Soviet Military Administration and the KPD favored those who 
could prove commitment to their Party line. They spoke of an anti-fascist democracy, but 
they meant something different than the anti-Nazi society the West wanted to build. 
Where the West was interested in rooting out specific people, the East wanted to root out 
the whole ideology and whole groups of people who represented it. This led to vastly 
different visions of how to construct the future Germany, and an increasingly separate 
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path was seen in the development of intellectual, social and cultural institutions in the 
East.   
 In the East the number of suspected Nazis removed from power was greater than 
the number of people available to replace them. This caused widespread shortages in 
many critical professions, such as teaching, law, and medicine. Therefore, the Soviet 
Military Administration started modifying its policies in order to be more lenient about 
the purging of Nazis. Changes were necessary in order to allow them to find people to fill 
positions in those key professions and other institutions. In addition, along with being 
more lenient about the removal of Nazis, the Soviet Military Administration was 
simultaneously encouraging and almost requiring the participation of Communists in 
these institutions and organizations. Certain mass organizations such as the Free German 
Trade Union and the Free German Youth started out as organizations to help spur 
reconstruction, but eventually became large central institutions for the working class and 
children. Is it striking that these two organizations also closely mimicked organizations 
found in the Soviet Union. This in itself demonstrated close ties to the Soviet Union, 
which were tough to break. The educational system underwent a transformation in its 
teaching staff and its curriculum. The introduction of Neulehrer into a new school system 
provided staff, but these young teachers were undertrained, and increasingly their make-
up training emphasized Marxist-Leninist ideology. The educational system was 
centralized and the curriculum standardized, focusing on current events and recent history 
before the Nazi takeover, and requiring Russian language study at all levels. This 
inevitably skewed the perception of students as they learned about the postwar world. 
Finally, the cultural sphere underwent a reconstruction similar to that in the educational 
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system. It was taken over by politically reliable people as early as 1945 and the influence 
of these KPD and SPD members continued to grow throughout the 1940s. The 
Sovietizing socialist influence permeated society more and more, and it was this trend 
that accelerated the split between East and West and the creation of two Germanies.  
Wolfgang Leonhard, that unusually liberal Communist who was part of the 
Moscow contingent of East German Communists, broke with the KPD in 1948 and fled 
to Yugoslavia and eventually the United States. The story of Wolfgang Leonhard is 
helpful in studying the origins of the German Democratic Republic because it provides a 
perspective that few other sources are able to provide on the thoughts and motives of the 
KPD and how they saw the Soviet Union and its policies. Though his account reflects his 
frustrations with and anger against the Party that he defected from, it is still useful in 
trying to understand overall developments, which is why he is featured so often 
throughout this thesis. He is used as an example of how disingenuous support of the KPD 
may actually have been. Leonhard supported the KPD aims as the Ulbricht group arrived 
in Berlin in May 1945, but by 1948 a series of disappointing KPD actions led him to lose 
faith in the Party. He tells of developments taking place throughout the Eastern Bloc, 
which inevitably included East Germany. After the Party declared in 1948 that there 
could be no uniquely German road to Socialism, he decided to quit. In denouncing the 
idea of a unique road to German socialism, the KPD completely aligned itself with the 
aims of the Soviet Union. The tightening of Soviet control over East Germany that 
Leonhard saw during the 1946 elections became a reality in 1948. There was now a 
seemingly unbreakable bond with the Soviet Union. If members of the KPD were 
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suspicious of the aims of the Party, we can infer that some of that suspicion was shared 
by the majority of the East German population.  
The repressive control of the Soviet Union over the entire Eastern Bloc and 
particularly East Germany increased, and the Iron Curtain created an air of mystery 
around life in the East. Later developments such as the creation of the Berlin Wall  in 
1961 served to physically divide East and West and provided even more context for the 
mystery of the East. It is only since the collapse of the DDR in 1989 that more 
information has become available about life in East Germany. The writing of Leonhard 
provides insight about how it was in the beginning, but so much was censored and 
repressed during the forty-year history of East Germany that it was hard, and still is hard, 
to really know what was going on inside. The general impression was of a grey and 
repressed society ruled by bureaucratic Communists, subservient to and totally dependent 
on Moscow and a powerful secret police (the Stasi, Staatssicherheitsdienst) that seduced 
the worst and the best into informing on their friends and neighbors. In large measure, 
this view has been confirmed by what we have learned since the fall of the DDR. The 
2006 film Das Leben der Anderen (The Lives of Others) chronicles the life of an East 
Berlin secret agent who conducts surveillance on a writer and his lover. It illustrates the 
darkness of a society that is repressed by the all pervasive presence of the secret police 
and informants. Neighbors were spying on one another and there was no sense of real 
security or privacy. Throughout the movie the difficulties of being an informant are 
highlighted as the reality of the restrictions of the German state come to be realized by all 
the characters. Modern films such as these try to provide some insight into the lives of 
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those under Communist rule, but even today there will still be mysteries and questions 
that cannot be fully answered.  
After 1949 there were changes in SED leadership as well as changes in Soviet 
leadership that led to changed relations between the Eastern Bloc and its Soviet parent. 
This change of relations eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Berlin today 
still reflects the divisions that were present in German society for 40 years, but it has seen 
enormous growth as a city as has Germany collectively as one country. The study of East 
Germany is still important, even in an age beyond the termination of its existence. It is 
important to understand how relations between countries reached the point of seemingly 
no return as they did in 1949. In studying history people can see overarching patterns and 
use them to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. Though the creation of the 
German Democratic Republic is an event that happened 76 years ago, it can still be used 
as a case study for the future. 
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